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1THE  (BOUNDEDLY) RATIONAL BASIS OF TRADEMARK LIABILITY: 
 
RECONCILING THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT 
AND THE LANHAM ACT 
 
ABSTRACT: The confusion that has accompanied the effort to 
graft a dilution remedy onto federal trademark law has sown deep 
uncertainty about the remedy's proper scope and purpose.  This 
confusion is an outgrowth of the peculiar history of dilution theory 
in the development of trademark law, and the resulting tension 
between uniqueness-based theories of dilution and theories based 
on free-riding concerns.  This Article takes the position that the 
current conceptual framework for trademark liability is misguided.  
By focusing its analysis on consumer beliefs about the relationship 
between a mark and a manufacturer, current trademark doctrine is 
ignoring a far more persuasive justification for the imposition of 
liability: debiasing.  This Article argues that trademark liability is 
best understood as a legal regime designed to harness the 
efficiencies of boundedly rational consumer decisionmaking, while 
minimizing the effects of  resulting biases and errors.  An overview 
of trademark cases reveals that while courts say they are analyzing 
consumer beliefs about the mark/maker nexus, they in fact rely on 
a limited set of proxy measurements that have little to do with 
those beliefs.  Instead, the proxy factors appear to represent 
features of the marketplace with strong potential to trigger 
cognitive phenomena that can generate bias and error.  
Understanding these phenomena and using them as a guide to set 
the boundaries of liability provides a more coherent and 
persuasive justification for the trademark regime than current 
competing rationales, and offers a potential solution to the long-
standing debate between free-riding and uniqueness theories of 
dilution that would harmonize those theories with infringement 
policy. 
 
2Introduction
The protection of trade-marks is the law’s recognition of the 
psychological function of symbols.  If it is true that we live by 
symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them.2
Federal trademark law stands at a crossroads.  In the case of Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc.,3 the Supreme Court cast the vitality of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 
19954 (“FTDA”), and with it the bifurcated structure of the federal trademark regime, into 
serious doubt.  Since that decision was handed down, courts and commentators have debated 
exactly what trademark dilution is and how it differs from trademark infringement,5 practitioners 
have struggled to advise their clients as to the availability and merits of federal dilution claims,6
and Congress has come to the brink of passing a statute specifically to overturn the Court’s 
 
2 Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 204 (1942) 
(Frankfurter, J.). 
3 537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
4 Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1996). 
5 See generally, e.g., Barton Beebe et al., Trademark Dilution:  Moseley and Beyond, 14
Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 849 (2004) (discussing the rippling effects of Moseley 
on trademark law); see also id. at 863 (“Because there has kind of been a blurring, if you’ll 
pardon the term, between the infringement and unfair competition portions of the statute and the 
dilution sections of the statute, it really has left the law as [a] kind of mishmash, where people 
don’t really know where they stand.”). 
6 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark:  European and United States Law 
Compared, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1167 (2004) (“Judges and attorneys are unclear as to 
exactly what ‘dilution’ is and how to prove it.  Consistency and predictability are hard to find. 
Giving legal advice about the federal anti-dilution law is a high risk endeavor.”). 
3decision.7 Much of this disarray stems from formalist doctrinal architecture that has been handed 
down over the past 135 years of developments in American trademark law.  For generations 
judges, legislators, and scholars have attempted to fit the square peg of trademark law into the 
round holes of either property law or unfair competition law, often at the expense of the real 
issues at stake in trademark regimes.  It is the position of this Article that trademark infringement 
and trademark dilution should not be understood as distinct species of harms to a particular type 
of property right, nor even as subsets of the law of unfair competition, but rather as related and 
overlapping categories of consumer responses to a single type of undesirable commercial 
behavior. 
The “likelihood of confusion” standard of the Lanham Act8 has long been used to 
apply liability for trademark infringement under the rubric of unfair competition.  This standard 
is unhelpful, however, in analyzing dilution, which explicitly rejects the Lanham Act’s 
“likelihood of confusion” standard, and does not require any actual or potential competition as a 
prerequisite to liability.  The juxtaposition of this doctrinal incompatibility with American 
trademark law’s historical conceptual aversion to property rights has grossly complicated any 
coherent integration of dilution into the federal trademark regime.  Though the tools of doctrinal 
development have to date been unhelpful in providing a coherent theory of dilution within the 
broader law of trademarks, the insights of cognitive psychology—which have already been 
 
7 See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 (“TDRA”), H.R. 683, 109th Cong. (2005).  
A version of the TDRA was passed by the House on April 19, 2005, see 151 CONG. REC. H2121-
23 [daily ed. April 19, 2005], and a substituted version passed the Senate on March 8, 2006, see 
152 CONG. REC. S1921-23 [daily ed. March 8, 2006]. 
8 Trademark Act of 1946 [hereinafter “Lanham Act”], Pub. L. No. 79-489, 60 Stat. 427 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1129 (2005)). 
4brought to bear in other areas of legal analysis under the aegis of “behavioralism”9—provide an 
elegant and robust framework for the analysis of all varieties of trademark cases. 
Writ large, behavioralism posits that human beings are not perfectly rational 
actors in the model of classical economics, but rather that we exhibit what has been termed 
“bounded rationality.”  In particular, numerous studies have documented that we tend to arrive at 
decisions by means of heuristics: mental short-cuts that generate factual or probabilistic 
judgments in the face of limited information, time, and resources.10 While many heuristics are 
often relatively accurate, and therefore useful, some heuristics constitute persistent cognitive 
biases that can generate persistent errors.  This Article argues that infringement and dilution are 
best understood as commercial behaviors that manipulate the cognitive biases of consumers, and 
as such threaten to render their heuristic judgments persistently inaccurate.  In this view, 
trademark liability—whether imposed under the label of infringement or dilution—is not 
designed to protect property rights of trademark owners, nor to protect them against the unfair 
trade practices of competitors, but to shape consumer markets in such a way as to conform to the 
innate cognitive processes of boundedly rational consumers.  The trademark regime can then be 
understood as a legal apparatus designed to accommodate and even harness non-rational human 
thought processes, rather than suppress or eradicate them.  The judicial outcomes of such a 
regime may be essentially indistinguishable from those of a system of property rights, but it will 
 
9 See generally BEHAVIORAL LAW & ECONOMICS (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000). 
10 The original authoritative collection of research in this field is JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic, & Amos Tversky eds., 
1982).  A new volume was recently published expanding on the work in the 1982 collection.  
HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGMENT (Thomas Gilovich, Dale 
Griffin, & Daniel Kahneman eds., 2002). 
5become clear that this resemblance is more a function of the mechanics of systemic market 
regulation than of any proprietary interest created under the law. 
Part I of this Article outlines the theoretical and doctrinal antagonism between the 
doctrines of trademark dilution and traditional trademark infringement, with an eye to the 
features of each that have historically kept them distinct from one another.  Part II dissects the 
various species of trademark liability that have developed under this bifurcated trademark 
regime.  Part III applies the theoretical and empirical insights of cognitive psychology to the 
elements of trademark doctrine outlined in Part II.  Part IV collects these insights into a cohesive 
theoretical framework for all species of trademark liability, and closes with some practical 
concerns surrounding the adoption of this framework, anticipating objections grounded in 
constitutional doctrine and public policy, and suggesting future roles for Congress, the courts, 
and the trademark bar.11 
11 The arguments and claims of this Article are theoretical rather than empirical in nature.  
Nevertheless, the arguments presented here are reasoned by analogy from empirical work in 
cognitive psychology, and it is anticipated that targeted empirical testing would confirm them.  
Such testing, however, is beyond the scope of the present undertaking and awaits further 
development. 
6I.  Schechter’s Legacy
In 1927 a New York lawyer by the name of Frank Schechter, then trademark 
counsel to the BVD company,12 published an article in the Harvard Law Review lamenting the 
rigidity and formalism of federal trademark doctrine.13 At the time, federal trademark protection 
was limited to the remedies provided in the patchwork of half-measures Congress had enacted 
since 1881.14 For over fifty years federal trademark law had been developing step by timid step 
within the strict boundaries of the Supreme Court’s 1879 ruling in the Trade-Mark Cases,15 
which seemed to have been crafted to keep Congress out of the trademark area altogether.16 In 
 
12 Beebe et al., supra note 5, at 853. 
13 Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 
(1927). 
14 See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1881, ch.138, 21 Stat. 502; Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 
58-84, 33 Stat. 724; Act of May 4, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-146, 34 Stat. 168; Act of March 2, 1907, 
Pub. L. No. 59-232, 34 Stat. 1251; Act of Feb. 18, 1911, Pub. L. No. 61-388, 36 Stat. 918; Act of 
Jan. 8, 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-347, 37 Stat. 649; Act of March 19, 1920, Pub. L. No. 66-163, 41 
Stat. 533; Act of June 7, 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-263, 43 Stat. 647; Act of March 4, 1925, Pub. L. 
No. 68-610, 43 Stat. 1268.  A leading commentator has described the state of trademark law in 
the period between the Trade-Mark Cases and the enactment of the Lanham Act as “a crazy quilt 
of modifications and amendments.”  1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS 
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 5:3, p. 5-9 (2004).  
15 100 U.S. 82 (1879). 
16 The Court seemed convinced that the states offered ample protection for trademarks, and 
that Congress’s foray into the arena was superfluous: 
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods or 
property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by 
all other persons, has been long recognized by the common law and the chancery 
courts of England and of this country, and by the statutes of some of the States. It 
is a property right for the violation of which damages may be recovered in an 
action at law, and the continued violation of it will be enjoined by a court of 
equity, with compensation for past infringement. This exclusive right was not 
created by the act of Congress, and does not now depend upon it for its 
enforcement. The whole system of trade-mark property and the civil remedies for 
 
7that ruling, the Court struck down the first federal trademark statute17 as unconstitutional.18 The 
Court held that Congress had no authority under the Patent and Copyright Clause19 to confer 
property rights in trademarks.20 It further held that because the Act of 1870 made no distinction 
between interstate or foreign commerce on the one hand, and intrastate commerce on the other,21 
Congress had overstepped its bounds under the Commerce power.22 Moreover, the Court 
expressed in dicta considerable hostility to the idea that trademarks were within the scope of the 
Commerce power at all.23 
The legacy of the Trade-Mark Cases—in particular of its holding under the Patent 
and Copyright Clause—was to instill in federal trademark doctrine a crippling aversion to 
anything that resembled a property right.  Even after the infirmities of the 1870 Act had been 
 
its protection existed long anterior to that act, and have remained in full force 
since its passage. 
Id. at 92. 
17 Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198, §§ 77-84. 
18 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 99. 
19 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
20 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 93-94 (“Any attempt, however, to identify the essential 
characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with 
the writings of authors, will show that the effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties.  
The ordinary trade-mark has no necessary relation to invention or discovery.”). 
21 The Court blithely assumed that “trade or traffic between citizens of the same State” 
constituted “perhaps the largest” share of the commerce regulated by the Act.  Id. at 96. 
22 See id. at 96-99. 
23 Id. at 95 (“Every species of property which is the subject of commerce, or which is used 
or even essential in commerce, is not brought by this [Commerce] clause within the control of 
Congress.”). 
8ameliorated,24 the Supreme Court continued to warn that “[t]here is no such thing as property in 
a trade-mark except as a right appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with 
which the mark is employed.”25 The trademark was no more than an indication of a product’s 
connection to its manufacturer, and the trademark right was accordingly understood as quasi-
proprietary:  it differed from rights “in gross or at large, like a statutory copyright or a patent for 
an invention”, in that it “grows out of its use”.26 In practical terms, this distinction meant that a 
trademark could only be enforced in the geographic and commercial sphere within which it was 
actually used by its owner to indicate a product’s source.  For example, in the case from which 
the quotations in this paragraph are taken, the Supreme Court rejected a claim of infringement by 
a manufacturer of medicinal preparations under the name “Regis” in New England against a 
manufacturer of medicinal preparations under the same name in Kentucky, on grounds that the 
two markets were “separate and remote from each other, so that the mark means one thing in one 
market, an entirely different thing in another.”27 Similarly, the federal statute in place at the time 
only imposed liability for the use of trademarks on goods of “substantially the same descriptive 
properties” as those of the trademark owner—in other words, goods that directly competed with 
 
24 The next attempt at a federal trademark statute was limited to “trade-marks used in 
commerce with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes.”  Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 1, 
21 Stat. 502, 502.  Marks used in commerce “among the several States” were brought under the 
federal trademark regime in 1905.  Act of Feb. 20, 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 1, 33 Stat. 724, 
724. 
25 United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., 248 U.S. 90, 97 (1918) (emphasis added). 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 100. 
9those of the trademark owner.28 The prevailing justification offered by the courts for these 
doctrines could charitably be described as sophistry:  “there can be no unfair competition where 
there is no competition at all.”29 
Such was the state of the law when Mr. Schechter penned his famous article.  His 
basic premise was that the historical function of trademarks embodied in Anglo-American law—
identifying the origin or ownership of goods—was an obsolete relic of a localized mode of 
commerce driven by craftsmen, guilds, and individual merchants.30 Schechter argued that in a 
complex modern economy where the manufacturers of goods were often unknown to the 
purchasers of those goods, “[t]he true functions of the trademark are… to identify a product as 
satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public.”31 In the 
commercial reality of the impersonal marketplace, he argued, trademarks served not merely to 
 
28 Trademark Act of 1905, Pub. L. No. 58-84, § 16, 33 Stat. 724, 728.  This principle was 
reinforced by the Supreme Court, which cited with approval the English rule that trademarks 
were only enforceable within the class of goods on which they were used by a plaintiff:  “If he 
does not carry on a trade in iron, but carries on a trade in linen, and stamps a lion on his linen, 
another person may stamp a lion on iron.” Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 
414 (1916), quoting Ainsworth v. Walmsley, 1 L.R.Eq. 518, 524 (1866).  While the American 
preoccupation with property rights in trademarks stemmed from the strictures of the Patent and 
Copyright Clause, the British rule was based on the early view, long since abandoned, that 
proprietary rights in trademarks were monopolistic and therefore bad policy.  See Blanchard v. 
Hill, 2 Atk. 484 (1742), 26 Eng. Rep. 692 (denying an injunction against alleged trademark 
piracy on grounds that to do so would grant monopolistic rights); see also Norma Dawson, 
English Trade Mark Law in the Eighteenth Century, 24 J. LEGAL HIST. 111 (2003) (exploring the 
historical background of the Blanchard case). 
29 Edward C. Lukens, Application of the Principles of Unfair Competition to Cases of 
Dissimilar Products, 75 U. PENN. L. REV. 197, 198 & n.4 (1927) (citing cases). 
30 Schechter, supra note 13, at 814 (“Four hundred years ago a trademark indicated either 
the origin or ownership of the goods to which it was affixed.  To what extent does the trademark 
of today really function as either?  Actually, not in the least!”). 
31 Id. at 818. 
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symbolize the goodwill of their owners in the mind of consumers, but as a vehicle for building 
and storing such goodwill.32 
Schechter believed that the framing of trademark doctrine under the rubric of 
unfair competition—and specifically of the doctrine of “passing off”33—inadequately protected 
this important function of trademarks, and he traced the law’s shortcoming specifically to the 
two features of trademark law outlined above:  the resistance to trademark rights that resembled 
property rights “in gross” rather than “of use”, and the concomitant limitation of trademark 
liability to competing goods within a geographically-defined market.34 Yet rather than directly 
challenge the federal courts’ hostility to full property rights in trademarks, Schechter proposed an 
alternative theory of trademark liability derived from German law:  dilution.35 Schechter’s 
theory of dilution rested on the premise that the ability of a trademark to serve as a vehicle for 
creating and perpetuating goodwill depends on its “uniqueness,” and that multiple unrelated uses 
of an unusual or distinctive mark will prevent that mark from developing a strong, unique hold 
on the public consciousness.36 This theory would give the first user of a particularly unique or 
distinctive mark the right to enforce her mark broadly—not merely within the geographic 
 
32 Id. at 818-19 (“[T]oday the trademark is not merely the symbol of good will but often the 
most effective agent for the creation of good will, imprinting upon the public mind an 
anonymous and impersonal guaranty of satisfaction, creating a desire for further satisfactions.”). 
33 Id. at 820 (noting that the law of England and the United States aimed “simply to prevent 
the deceitful sale or passing off of goods made by one person or firm for goods made by 
another.”), quoting Myron W. Watkins, The Change in Trust Policy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 815, 831
(1922). 
34 Schechter, supra note 13, at 821-24. 
35 Id. at 831-33. 
36 Id. at 824-26. 
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markets in which she operated, but also in neighboring regions; not merely against competing 
products, but also against sellers of non-competing goods—all on the theory that any interference 
with her efforts to build and retain the association of goodwill with her trademark threatens 
gradually to weaken that association, thereby reducing her incentive to cultivate such goodwill.37 
Built into Schechter’s new theory of trademark law is a tension that was uniquely 
a product of the legal regime of Schechter’s era, yet one that continues to influence trademark 
doctrine to this day.  Schechter was proposing a remedy for an injury that courts of the time had 
considered but refused to redress: the harm to a trademark owner caused by a second comer’s use 
of the mark on non-competing goods.  In order to support the new remedy without running afoul 
of contemporary doctrine that limited trademark rights to the commercial sphere of their actual 
use, Schechter was forced to invent an alternative injury arising from the same conduct he sought 
a legal remedy against.  To that end, he advanced a slippery-slope argument concerning an 
incidental effect of unauthorized use on the trademark owner—the potential but as-yet-
unrealized cumulative effect of repeated unauthorized use of the owner’s mark on non-
competing goods—rather than the more obvious direct effect of unauthorized use of trademarks 
on non-competing goods—the invocation of consumer goodwill associated with the mark.  
Schechter used this somewhat misleading technique despite the fact that the unauthorized 
invocation of goodwill, rather than its potential long-term erosion, appeared to be his primary 
concern.38 The result of this theoretical shell game is a bifurcation of the concept of dilution into 
 
37 Id. at 825-33.  
38 See Schechter, supra note 13, at 825 (alluding to the the “subtle[ty] and refine[ment]” of 
“[t]rademark pirates” who “proceed circumspectly, by suggestion and approximation, rather than 
by direct and exact duplication of their victims’ wares and marks.”). 
12 
two separate and somewhat antagonistic theories.  The first theory focuses on the level of 
“uniqueness” of the owner’s mark, regardless of any benefit a second comer might derive from 
its use.  I will refer to this theory as the “uniqueness theory” of trademark liability.  The second 
theory focuses on a second comer’s unauthorized invocation of the goodwill associated with the 
mark, regardless of the immediate effect on the trademark owner.  I will call this the “free-riding 
theory” of trademark liability.  Whether the dilution remedy is properly directed at the trademark 
owner’s injury (the uniqueness theory) or the second comer’s benefit (the free-riding theory) is a 
debate that continues to this day, as will be seen below.39 
Regardless of the true justification for his proposed remedy, Schechter’s call for a 
radical reconceptiualization of trademark law received a cool reception among federal 
authorities.  As Schechter had noted in his own article,40 the “same descriptive qualities” 
requirement under the 1905 Act was already being liberalized, and the process continued without 
any radical statutory or doctrinal innovations.41 Not until the advent of the revolution in 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence ushered in by West Coast Hotel v. Parrish42 was there any 
serious reformulation of federal trademark law, and even that left dilution squarely out of the 
 
39 See infra notes 58-60,112-114 and accompanying text. 
40 See id. at 823-24. 
41 Compare Yale Elec. Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) (“[A] 
merchant may have a sufficient economic interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his 
own exploitation to justify interposition by a court.”), with Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney, 247
F. 407 (2d Cir. 1917) (finding infringement of a trademark used on syrup in use of the same 
mark on related products such as pancake batter). 
42 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
13 
picture.  A few years after West Coast Hotel was decided the Lanham Act was passed,43 laying 
the groundwork for the next half-century of American trademark law.  Rather than broadly 
rethinking the nature and function of trademarks, as Schechter suggested, the new statute set off 
a gradual expansion of liability within the historical traditions of Anglo-American trademark 
doctrine.  For example, Section 32 of the Lanham Act—which defines infringement of registered 
trademarks—eliminated the “same descriptive properties” requirement in favor of a flexible 
standard for determining infringement that is still largely with us:  whether an allegedly 
infringing use is “likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive purchasers as to 
the source of origin of…goods.”44 A later amendment removed the explicit reference to “source 
of origin” from this provision,45 further loosening but not quite casting off the historical tether on 
federal trademark law that Schechter had lambasted as an archaism.46 Meanwhile, judicial 
interpretation of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act—which by its terms originally prohibited only 
“false designations of origin”47 but over time became the primary vehicle for enforcing 
unregistered trademarks, service marks, and trade dress—broadened the scope of the confusion 
 
43 The Lanham Act was introduced by Congressman Lanham the year after West Coast 
Hotel was decided, but the pressures of war and the vagaries of the legislative process prevented 
its enactment until 1946.  For narrative histories of the formulation and promulgation of the 
Lanham Act, see Edward S. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks,
14 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 177-181; and 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 5:4, pp. 5-10 to 
5-13. 
44 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489 § 32, 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 
1114). 
45 Act of October 9, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-772, 76 Stat. 769. 
46 See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
47 Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 79-489 § 43(a), 60 Stat. 427 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)). 
14 
inquiry, and a 1988 amendment to Section 43(a) essentially codified these judicial innovations, 
prohibiting the commercial use of any mark that 
is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, 
connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, 
sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by 
another person.48 
Taken together these amendments expanded upon, but never discarded, the 
Anglo-American common-law tradition of treating trademarks as designators of source or origin.  
The Lanham Act continues to directly address the consumer’s perception of the information a 
mark conveys about the relationship between the mark’s owner and the product bearing the 
mark; the universe of relevant relationships has simply expanded.  The result has been 
liberalization of some of the more arbitrary doctrines Schechter disdained.  For example, the 
“same descriptive properties” rule that emanated from the antipathy to trademark rights “in 
gross,” already weakened in cases such as Yale and Aunt Jemima,49 gave way under the Lanham 
Act to a self-consciously flexible standard that extends trademark infringement liability to 
“related goods” on a case-by-case basis.50 Thus, for nearly fifty years federal trademark law 
gradually broadened the scope of liability to encompass much—but not all—of the conduct 
 
48 Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988 (TLRA), Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)).  Commentators have noted that the TLRA’s 
amendment of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act was made “in large part to codify the case law 
interpretation of the previous version of §43(a).”  1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 5:9(5), page 
5-17; accord Marie V. Driscoll, The “New” 43(a), 79 TRADEMARK REPORTER 238, 239 (1989). 
49 See supra note 41. 
50 See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at §§ 24:5-24:6, pages 24-11 to 24-16.  Cases 
illustrating this feature of Lanham Act jurisprudence are discussed in Section II.A, infra.
15 
Schechter had complained of, without abandoning the conceptual framework inherited from the 
previous century of doctrinal development. 
In the face of federal complacency, a few states supplemented the federal regime 
with their own dilution statutes.  Massachusetts became the first state to enact a dilution statute 
along the lines suggested in Schechter’s article in 1947.51 The trademark bar promoted this trend 
with a model state trademark statute that included a section on dilution.52 Nevertheless, by 1995 
only about half the states had enacted any kind of dilution statute.53 That year, Congress finally 
responded to the pleas of the trademark plaintiffs bar for a federal dilution statute, and enacted 
the FTDA.  The main provision of the FTDA reads as follows: 
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity 
and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against 
another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such 
use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is provided in 
this subsection.54 
The definition of dilution offered by the statute bears the unmistakable stamp of Schechter’s 
influence: 
The term “dilution” means the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence 
of— 
 
51 1947 Mass. Acts 300. 
52 MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 12 (1964); MODEL STATE TRADEMARK BILL § 13 
(1992). 
53 See H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995). 
54 FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, sec. 3, § (c)(1), 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1996), codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2005). 
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(1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, 
or 
(2) likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.55 
The reference to “lessening the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services”56 echoes Schechter’s concern for the trademark owner’s investment and interest in a 
strong mark:  “The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public 
consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the 
particular product in connection with which it has been used.”57 More importantly, the FTDA’s 
provision for relief “regardless of the presence or absence of competition between the owner of 
the famous mark and other parties” embraces—even more completely than the “related products” 
standard58—Schechter’s call for a remedy against unauthorized use of a mark “upon non-
competing goods.”59 In short, the text of the FTDA nearly perfectly embodies the uniqueness 
theory of dilution.  The legislative history of the statute, however, suggests that the lawmakers 
who crafted it were more swayed by the free-riding theory of dilution, as the committee report 
stated:  “The concept of dilution recognizes the substantial investment the owner has made in the 
mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark itself, protecting both from those who 
 
55 FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(2005). 
56 Id. (emphasis added). 
57 Schechter, supra note 13, at 825. 
58 See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
59 Id. (emphasis added). 
17 
would appropriate the mark for their own gain.”60 Thus, in adopting Schechter’s remedy, 
Congress fell victim to the contradiction inherent in its underlying justification, even though the 
doctrines that gave rise to that contradiction had been moribund for decades.  Nor did the FTDA 
revisit the theoretical underpinnings of all trademark law as Schechter had attempted; it simply 
grafts the dilution remedy on to the corpus of traditional trademark law embodied in the Lanham 
Act, while leaving that law intact. 
This tenuous parallel system of trademark remedies is the result of the tension 
among the competing theories of trademark liability identified in this Part:  the uniqueness 
theory, which holds that trademark liability should be imposed to provide manufacturers with the 
means and incentive to create and preserve consumer goodwill; and the free-riding theory, which 
holds that trademark liability should be imposed to prevent second comers from 
misappropriating the consumer goodwill generated by another’s trademark.  In confronting this 
theoretical tension while still maintaining their aversion to trademark rights “in gross”, courts 
interpreting the FTDA have attempted to shoehorn dilution law into the common-law theory, 
exposing not only the incompatibility between the infringement and dilution remedies as 
currently conceived, but also the inconsistency of modern trademark infringement doctrine with 
the common-law theory of trademarks as identifiers of source. 
 
60 H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 3 (1995). 
18 
II.  The Species of Trademark Liability
Even after the statutory developments discussed in the previous section, federal 
trademark doctrine remains wedded to the common law’s conceptual nexus of a mark and a 
manufacturer—between a source and its symbol.  Although the Lanham Act doctrine of 
confusion has now broadened from its original scope of source of origin to include concepts such 
as affiliation, connection, or sponsorship, all these concepts relate back to the manufacturer:  
they speak not to the consumer’s general beliefs about the trademark-bearing product but to her 
specific belief about the marked product’s relationship to an entity—even an anonymous or 
unknown entity—that owns the mark.61 Dilution doctrine, in contrast, appears mainly concerned 
with the stability of that specific belief:  it is designed to prevent the consumer from associating a 
famous mark with more than one manufacturer, or to shield the association from the influence of 
other manufacturers.  Ostensibly, then, all trademark liability doctrine is concerned with the 
consumer’s mental association between a mark and a maker—indeed, courts go so far as to 
invent an unknown, anonymous manufacturer in the consumer’s mind in order to preserve this 
doctrinal focus.62 However, as this Part will show, courts often assess this mental association by 
 
61 The theoretical complexities of the relationship between a mark, a marked product, and 
the information supposedly conveyed by the mark are extensively explored in Barton Beebe, The 
Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA L. REV. 621 (2004). 
62 The so-called “anonymous source doctrine,” which dates back to Schechter’s days, 
continues to be one of the more awkward aspects of trademark law.  See Bayer Co. v. United 
Drug Co. (Aspirin), 272 F. 505, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (“[T]he question is whether the buyers 
merely understood that the word ‘Aspirin’ meant this kind of drug, or whether it meant that . . . it 
came from the same single, though . . . anonymous, source from which they had got it before.”).  
In response to a confused set of decisions in the Anti-Monopoly cases (Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. 
General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 684 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1982); Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General 
Mills Fun Group, Inc., 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979); CPG Prods. Corp. v. Anti-Monopoly, Inc.,
459 U.S. 1227 (1983)), Congress amended the Lanham Act to make the anonymous source 
doctrine explicit.  See Trademark Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3335 
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means of various proxy criteria, and these proxy criteria, in turn, suggest a different and more 
generalized concern at the heart of trademark law. 
A.  Infringement 
“[W]hether a claim is brought under [15 U.S.C.] § 1114 for infringement of a 
registered mark, or whether it is brought under [15 U.S.C.] § 1125(a) for infringement of an 
unregistered mark, the touchstone of the claim is likelihood of confusion.”63 Under the language 
of these statutes, a court deciding whether infringement exists must determine whether it is likely 
that purchasers or potential purchasers viewing the defendant’s mark will either:  (a) be confused 
into thinking that the product bearing that mark originates with, or is sponsored or approved by 
 
§ 103 (1984) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1127) (defining “trademark” as “any word, 
name, symbol, or device…adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant …to indicate the 
source of [his] goods, even if that source is unknown.” (emphasis added)).  In that same statute 
Congress made a tentative effort to loosen the grip of the mark/maker relationship on one aspect 
of trademark doctrine, but this effort has been largely unsuccessful.  See id. § 102 (1984) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3)) (stating that a trademark may be “used as a name 
of or to identify a unique product or service” without becoming generic); Beebe, supra note 61, 
at 652-53 (describing 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) as a less-than-successful attempt to force courts “to 
distinguish between marks that are ‘distinctive of plaintiff's product’ and marks that are 
‘distinctive of a product's source,’ (emphasis added) while preserving trademark protection over 
both classes of marks). 
63 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, 332 F.3d 915, 940 (6th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S. 111, ___, 
125 S.Ct. 542, 567 (2004) (noting that a claim of infringement “requires a showing that the 
defendant’s actual practice is likely to produce confusion in the minds of consumers about the 
origin of the goods or services in question”); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 
Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831-32 (11th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he touchstone test for a violation of § 43(a) is 
the likelihood of confusion resulting from the defendant's adoption of a trade dress similar to the 
plaintiff's.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); 3 McCarthy, supra note 14, at § 23:1, pages 23-
6 to 23-8 (“Likelihood of confusion is the basic test of both common-law trademark infringement 
and federal statutory trademark infringement.”) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted). 
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the trademark owner; or (b) be confused into thinking that the defendant is affiliated, connected, 
or associated with the trademark owner.64 
1.  Species of Confusion.—“The most common and widely recognized type of 
confusion that creates infringement is purchaser confusion of source which occurs at the time of 
purchase:  point of sale confusion.”65 In other words, liability for infringement is usually 
imposed where a defendant is using a trademark that causes consumers to believe that plaintiff is 
the source of defendant’s goods when purchasing defendant’s goods.  Other types of confusion 
are grounds for liability, however.  As has already been noted, confusion as to source is no more 
nor less actionable than confusion as to affiliation, approval, sponsorship, or the like.  Moreover, 
point-of-sale confusion is not the only scenario for which relief is available.  A trademark owner 
can obtain relief for “initial-interest confusion,” a bait-and-switch scenario in which a consumer 
is lured in by the confusion engendered by defendant’s mark but any such confusion is dispelled 
by the point-of-sale.66 Post-sale confusion, in which potential purchasers or the public at large 
 
64 See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1125(a). 
65 3 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 23:5, page 23-19. 
66 Grotrian, Helfferich, Shulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf. v. Steinway & Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1342 
(2d Cir. 1975); see also Dorr-Oliver, Inc. v. Fluid-Quip, Inc., 94 F.3d 376, 382 (7th Cir. 1996) 
(characterizing “bait and switch” techniques as actionable under a theory of initial interest 
confusion); Jordache Enters. v. Levi Strauss & Co., 841 F.Supp. 506, 514–15 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(describing initial interest confusion as a situation in which “potential customers initially are 
attracted to the junior user’s mark by virtue of its similarity to the senior user’s mark, even 
though these consumers are not actually confused at the time of purchase.”); Mobil Oil Corp. v. 
Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 1987) (imposing liability where 
defendant’s word mark “Pegasus” could engender initial confusion with plaintiff’s graphical 
flying-horse trademark, even if no such confusion existed at the time defendant closed any 
transactions); but see Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 549-
52 & n.15 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2005) (rejecting initial interest confusion as a basis for infringement 
of a product shape trademark in the absence of point-of-sale confusion, and suggesting that 
initial-interest confusion is largely limited to the context of Internet domain names). 
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are confused by defendant’s products when they are seen in the possession of prior purchasers, is 
also actionable.67 Finally, in some cases a second user of a trademark will overwhelm the 
marketplace such that consumers erroneously believe that the goods of the smaller first user—
who by virtue of priority in time has rights to the trademark—are those of the larger second user; 
this is known as “reverse confusion.”68 It will become apparent over the rest of this Article that 
these various species of confusion are differentiated from one another (and from other species of 
trademark liability) only by certain variations in the outcome of a limited set of mental processes 
underlying all trademark liability. 
2. Determining Likelihood of Confusion .—No matter which of these scenarios is 
at issue, the relevant analysis remains the same.  The question whether confusion is in fact likely 
is generally determined by means of an analysis derived in one way or another from the 1938 
 
67 Hermes Int’l v. Lederer de Paris Fifth Avenue, Inc., 219 F.3d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 2000) 
(“[A] loss occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it off to the public 
as the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing public and achieving the status of owning 
the genuine article at a knockoff price.”); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
799 F.2d 867, 872-73 (2d Cir. 1986) (“The confusion the [Lanham] Act seeks to prevent in [the 
post-sale] context is that a consumer seeing the familiar stitching pattern will associate the jeans 
with appellee and that association will influence his buying decisions.”); Mastercrafters Clock & 
Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constantin-Lecoultre Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 466 (2d Cir. 1955) 
(finding infringement where “plaintiff copied the design of the Atmos clock because plaintiff 
intended to, and did, attract purchasers who wanted a 'luxury design' clock[, and] some 
customers would buy plaintiff's cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the prestige gained by 
displaying what many visitors at the customers' homes would regard as a prestigious article”); 
but see Gibson Guitar Corp., 423 F.3d at 552 (6th Cir. Sept. 12, 2005) (rejecting post-sale 
confusion as a basis for infringement of a product shape trademark in the absence of point-of-
sale confusion). 
68 Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 957 (7th Cir. 1992) 
(“Reverse confusion occurs when a large junior user saturates the market with a tradamark 
similar or identical to that of the smaller senior user.”); Banff, Ltd. v. Federated Dept. Stores, 
Inc., 841 F.2d 486, 490 (2nd Cir. 1988) (“Reverse confusion is the misimpression that the junior 
user is the source of the senior user's goods.”). 
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Restatement of Torts, which set forth nine factors to be considered.69 Although “each of the 
thirteen federal circuit courts of appeal has developed its own version of the list and each appears 
to be jealous of its own formulation of factors,”70 the lists are all quite similar, as can be seen in 
Figure 1 on the following two pages: 
 
69 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 731 (1938).  See 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:29, page 
24-55.  The Tenth Circuit, in a departure from this model, draws its “likelihood of confusion” 
factors from section 729 of the Restatement.  Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 
558 n.5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. 
Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) (same). 
70 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:30, page 24-57. 
23
FIGURE 1
“LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION” FACTORS, BY CIRCUIT71
CIRCUIT FACTORS CIRCUIT FACTORS
First72
1) Similarity of the marks
2) Similarity of the goods
3) Relationship between the parties' channels of trade
4) Relationship between the parties' advertising
5) Classes of prospective purchasers
6) Evidence of actual confusion
7) Defendant's intent in adopting its mark
8) Strength of the plaintiff's mark
Third73
1) Degree of similarity between the marks
2) Strength of plaintiff’s mark
3) Price of the goods and other factors indicative of expected consumer care and attention at point-of-sale
4) Length of time defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion arising
5) Defendant’s intent in adopting the mark
6) Evidence of actual confusion
7) Similarity of channels of trade and advertising media
8) Similarity of targets of the parties' sales efforts
9) Relationship of the goods in the minds of consumers due to similarity of function
10) Other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect plaintiff to manufacture a product in the
defendant's market, or that plaintiff is likely to expand into that market.
Second74
1) Strength of plaintiff’s mark
2) Degree of similarity between the marks
3) Proximity of the products
4) Likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap
5) Actual confusion
6) Defendant's good or bad faith
7) Quality of defendant's product
8) Sophistication of the buyers
Fourth75
1) Strength or distinctiveness of the mark
2) Similarity of the two marks
3) Similarity of the goods/services the marks identify
4) Similarity of the facilities the parties use in their businesses
5) Similarity of the advertising used by the parties
6) Defendant's intent
7) Actual confusion
8) Proximity of the products as they are actually sold
9) Probability that the senior mark owner will "bridge the gap" by entering the defendant's market
10) Quality of the defendant’s product in relationship to the quality of plaintiff’s product
11) Sophistication of the buyers
71 The D.C. Circuit has yet to announce the factors it deems relevant in determining likelihood of confusion. 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:42, page 24-73. The Federal Circuit’s test, as articulated by the Court
of Customs and Patent Appeals, only comes into play in proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office (such as registration proceedings), and thus is not directly relevant to liability issues. Application of E. I. Dupont
De Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (P.App. Cir. 1973) (setting forth thirteen-factor test for refusing registration based on likelihood of confusion with the mark of a prior user).
72 Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989).
73 Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 463 (3rd Cir. 1983).
74 Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); see also TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, 244 F.3d 88, 100 (2d Cir. 2001).
75 Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1527 (4th Cir. 1984); Shakespeare Co. v. Silstar Corp. Of Am., 110 F.3d 234, 241-42 (4th Cir. 1997). Pizzeria Uno lists only the first seven factors; Shakespeare lists
all eleven.
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CIRCUIT FACTORS CIRCUIT FACTORS
Fifth76
1) Strength of the plaintiff's mark
2) Similarity of design between the marks
3) Similarity of the products
4) Identity of retail outlets and purchasers
5) Similarity of advertising media used
6) The defendant's intent
7) Actual confusion
8) Degree of care exercised by potential purchasers
Eighth77
1) Strength and distinctiveness of plaintiff’s mark
2) Overall visual and aural similarity of the marks
3) Relatedness of products
4) Competitive proximity
5) Defendant’s intent to pass off its goods as the product of another
6) Actual confusion
7) Degree of purchaser care in light of the kind, cost, and conditions of purchase of the product
Sixth78
1) Strength of the plaintiff's mark
2) Relatedness of the goods
3) Similarity of the marks
4) Evidence of actual confusion
5) Marketing channels used
6) Likely degree of purchaser care
7) Defendant's intent in selecting the mark
8) Likelihood of expansion of the product lines
Ninth79
1) Strength of the mark
2) Proximity of the goods
3) Similarity of the marks
4) Evidence of actual confusion
5) Marketing channels used
6) Type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser
7) Defendant's intent in selecting the mark
8) Likelihood of expansion of the product lines
Seventh80
1) Degree of similarity between the marks
2) Similarity of the products
3) Area and manner of concurrent use
4) Degree of care likely to be exercised by consumers
5) Strength of the plaintiff’s mark
6) Actual confusion
7) Defendant’s intent to palm off his products as those of another
Tenth81
1) Degree of similarity between the marks
2) Defendant’s intent in adopting the mark
3) Similarity of use and manner of marketing between the parties’ products
4) Likely degree of purchaser care
Eleventh82
1) Strength of plaintiff's mark
2) Similarity between the marks
3) Similarity between the products
4) Similarity of sales methods
5) Similarity of advertising methods
6) Defendant's intent
7) Actual confusion
76 Roto-Rooter Corp. v. O'Neal, 513 F.2d 44, 45 (5th Cir. 1975); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Limited, 155 F.3d 526, 543 (5th Cir. 1998).
The eighth factor is mentioned only in Oreck, which also substitutes “strength of plaintiff’s mark” for the reference in Roto-Rooter and Pebble Beach refer to the “type” of the mark, suggesting that “type” is merely another
word for mark strength as measured along the spectrum of distinctiveness set forth by Judge Friendly in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); see infra § III.B.2. See Oreck, 803 F.2d
at 170-171. The Oreck formulation is reflected in Figure 1.
77 SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Advertising, 780 F.2d 1324, 1330 (8th Cir. 1985) (citing SquirtCo, 628 F.2d at 1091). Co-Rect does not separately identify
factor 3, and does not develop the other factors in as much detail as does SquirtCo.
78 Frisch's Restaurants, Inc. v. Elby's Big Boy, 670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982).
79 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979).
80 Helene Curtis Indus. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1977).
81 Amoco Oil Co. v. Rainbow Snow, 748 F.2d 556, 558 n.5 (10th Cir. 1984) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938)); Beer Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 940 (10th Cir. 1983) (same).
82 Conagra, Inc. v. Singleton, 743 F.2d 1508, 1514 (11th Cir. 1984).
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The similarities among these circuit-specific lists should be apparent.  Every 
circuit includes factors regarding the similarity of the marks83 and the defendant’s intent.84 All 
except the Tenth Circuit include factors regarding strength of the plaintiff’s mark85 and evidence 
of actual confusion.86 All except the Eleventh Circuit (and to some extent the First Circuit) 
consider the sophistication of, or degree of care likely to be exercised by, purchasers and 
prospective purchasers.87 And all the remaining factors address in one way or another the 
proximity (or overlap) of the commercial spheres in which the two parties’ products are found—
 
83 Factor 1 in the First Circuit, Factor 2 in the Second Circuit, Factor 1 in the Third Circuit, 
Factor 2 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 1 
in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 2 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 1 in 
the Tenth Circuit, and Factor 2 in the Eleventh Circuit.  See Fig. 1, supra.
84 Factor 7 in the First Circuit, Factor 6 in the Second Circuit, Factor 5 in the Third Circuit, 
Factor 6 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 6 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 7 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 7 
in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 5 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 7 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 2 in 
the Tenth Circuit, and Factor 6 in the Eleventh Circuit.  See Fig. 1, supra.
85 Factor 8 in the First Circuit, Factor 1 in the Second Circuit, Factor 2 in the Third Circuit, 
Factor 1 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 1 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 1 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 5 
in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 1 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 1 in the Ninth Circuit, and Factor 1 
in the Eleventh Circuit.  See id. 
86 Factor 6 in the First Circuit, Factor 5 in the Second Circuit, Factors 4 and 6 in the Third 
Circuit, Factor 7 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 7 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 4 in the Sixth Circuit, 
Factor 6 in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 6 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 4 in the Ninth Circuit, and 
Factor 7 in the Eleventh Circuit.  See id. The Tenth Circuit’s departure from its sister circuits on 
mark strength and actual confusion is likely attributable to the fact that it based its list on section 
729 of the Restatement of Torts, while the other circuits derived their tests from section 731.  See 
supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
87 Factor 8 in the Second Circuit, Factor 3 in the Third Circuit, Factor 11 in the Fourth 
Circuit, Factor 8 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 6 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 4 in the Seventh 
Circuit, Factor 7 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 6 in the Ninth Circuit, and Factor 4 in the Tenth 
Circuit.  See id. Factor 5 in the First Circuit addresses “classes of prospective purchasers,” but 
this factor is grouped with other factors relating to the overlap in the parties’ markets, 
specifically whether they are likely to share a substantial amount of customers.  Boston Athletic 
Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 30 (1st Cir. 1989).  The court has said that the relative expertise 
of the relevant classes of customers is sometimes, but not always, relevant to likelihood of 
confusion.  Id. 
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either in similarity of the products themselves (along dimensions such as the function of the 
goods or their relative quality or cost),88 similarity of the commercial or geographic contexts of 
their sale (including the venues in which they are sold and the likelihood that the plaintiff will 
expand the scope of its business to overlap with that of the defendant),89 similarity of their target 
audiences,90 or similarity of the techniques and media used to advertise and market them.91 
Collectively, these factors can be understood as addressing whether consumers are likely to 
encounter both parties’ products (and, hence, their marks) in a similar commercial context, and 
this Article will use the term “proximity of markets” as a shorthand for the various comparisons 
in this subset of the likelihood of confusion test. 
All the various tests for likelihood of confusion—whether they have four factors 
or eleven—boil down to the six essential concerns described in the previous paragraph: actual 
confusion, strength of plaintiff’s mark, similarity of marks, proximity of markets, degree of 
consumer care, and defendant’s intent.  All these factors purport to measure the likelihood of 
 
88 Factor 2 in the First Circuit, Factors 3 and 7 in the Second Circuit, Factor 9 in the Third 
Circuit, Factors 3 and 10 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 3 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Sixth 
Circuit, Factor 2 in the Seventh Circuit, Factor 3 in the Eighth Circuit, Factor 2 in the Ninth 
Circuit, and Factor 3 in the Eleventh Circuit all speak to this issue.  See Fig. 1, supra. The Tenth 
Circuit also considers product similarity to some extent, under the rubric of its Factor 3.  Beer 
Nuts, Inc. v. Clover Club Foods Co., 711 F.2d 934, 941 (10th Cir. 1983) (“Confusing similarity 
is most likely when the products themselves are very similar”). 
89 Factor 3 in the First Circuit, Factors 3 and 4 in the Second Circuit, Factors 7 and 10 in the 
Third Circuit, Factors 4, 8, and 9 in the Fourth Circuit, Factor 4 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 3 in 
the Seventh Circuit, Factor 4 in the Eighth Circuit, Factors 2, 5, and 8 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 
3 in the Tenth Circuit, and Factor 4 in the Eleventh Circuit.  See Fig. 1, supra.
90 Factor 5 in the First Circuit and Factor 8 in the Third Circuit.  Id. 
91 Factor 4 in the First Circuit, Factor 7 in the Third Circuit, Factor 5 in the Fourth Circuit, 
Factor 5 in the Fifth Circuit, Factor 5 in the Sixth Circuit, Factor 5 in the Ninth Circuit, Factor 3 
in the Tenth Circuit, and Factor 5 in the Eleventh Circuit.  Id. 
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consumer confusion as to source, affiliation, approval, or the like; but in fact only one of them 
actually attempts to take the measurement directly:  the “evidence of acutal confusion” factor.  
The remaining factors can be understood as proxy measurements:  accessible facts that are 
believed to have some relevant relationship to the attribute that is the target of inquiry, and are 
therefore expected to have predictive power as to the value of that target attribute.  Although the 
likelihood of confusion test is ostensibly concerned with the consumer’s perception of the 
relationship between mark and maker, most of the test’s proxy measurements are grounded in the 
circumstances of the consumer’s direct interaction with the trademarks in question and the 
products to which they are attached, without regard to the concept of a mark owner:  whether the 
marks are similar to one another, encountered on similar products, or encountered in similar 
contexts; whether they are unique or well-known, and whether the consumer will give care and 
thought to the purchase decision in which the trademark is encountered.  The one exception to 
the generalization that proxy measurements of likelihood of confusion are independent of the 
concept of a manufacturer—defendant’s intent—is a relic of the equitable origins of unfair 
competition law, but has lately been largely marginalized by the courts precisely because it is not 
believed to bear a sufficient relationship to consumer confusion.92 In fact, recent cases suggest 
that the defendant’s intent may be nothing more than an inferential link between similarity of 
 
92 See, e.g., Virgin Enters. Ltd v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that the 
defendant’s intent is not “of high relevance” because “[i]t does not bear directly on whether 
customers are likely to be confused”); Brookfield Communications v. West Coast Entertainment,
174 F.3d 1036, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the defendant’s intent “is only relevant to 
the extent that it bears upon the likelihood that consumers will be confused by the alleged 
infringer’s mark (or to the extent that a court wishes to consider it as an equitable 
consideration)”); Versa Prods. Co. v. Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 208 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[A] 
defendant’s intent weighs in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion only…where the 
product’s labeling and marketing are also affirmatively misleading.”). 
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marks and likelihood of confusion.  This link is part of a well-worn chain of reasoning: if a 
defendant knew of the plaintiff’s mark, and adopted a similar or identical mark, he must have 
thought he would confuse consumers and thereby capitalize on plaintiff’s goodwill, and he is 
likely to have succeeded in his efforts to confuse.93 In this view, the defendant’s intent is less of 
a proxy measurement in its own right than a gloss on the similarity-of-marks inquiry,94 and in 
fact it can even be viewed as a logically circular effort to justify the use of similarity of marks as 
a proxy for likelihood of confusion.  In light of these features of the treatment of defendant’s 
intent under trademark law, this Article will treat defendant’s intent as an offshoot of the 
similarity-of-marks inquiry, and will not address the former factor independently.95 
In sum, this section has attempted to reduce the various infringement tests to four 
primal factors that serve as proxies for likelihood of confusion in judicial analysis under the 
 
93 See, e.g., Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 205-08 (“[T]here is little or no competitive need to 
copy another’s distinctive symbol or presentation to sell one’s product, and …anyone who does 
so is most likely trying to cash in on the competitor's goodwill.”); American Chicle Co. v. Topps 
Chewing Gum, Inc., 208 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1953) (Learned Hand, J.) (“[A]s soon as we see 
that a second comer…plagiarized the make-up of an earlier comer, we need no more, for he at 
any rate thinks…that he is likely to succeed [in sowing confusion].” (internal quotation marks 
omitted)). 
94 See Versa Prods., 50 F.3d at 206 (holding that reliance on defendant’s intent “largely 
duplicates the weight given to the substantial-identity-of-appearance factor…in the likelihood of 
confusion inquiry”). 
95 Despite their avowed program to accord little weight to a defendant’s intent, recent 
empirical analysis suggests that judges rely very heavily on this factor when deciding trademark 
cases.  Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement,
95 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), at 35-40, available at 
http://www.bartonbeebe.com/documents/Beebe-An%20Empirical%20Study%20of%20the%20 
Multifactor%20Tests.pdf (discussing data showing that a finding against the defendant on the 
intent factor correlates almost perfectly to a finding against the defendant on the issue of 
liability).  Given the circularity of the reasoning behind the use of this factor as a determinant of 
liability, and the courts’ voluble disavowal of it, the empirical result of Professor Beebe’s 
analysis suggests that judicial discretion in trademark cases may require more stringent 
channelling.  See infra notes 230-233 and accompanying text. 
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Lanham Act:  similarity of marks, proximity of markets, strength of marks, and consumer care.  
As the next Part will demonstrate, courts’ use of these proxies to determine likelihood of 
confusion is something of an inversion:  the proxy factors are actually more direct measurements 
of the harm at issue in trademark cases than is consumer confusion as to source, affiliation, 
approval, or the like.  As will be made clear below, consumer confusion as to the relationship 
between manufacturers and trademarked products is simply a convenient framework for 
rationally discussing this harm, which is not amenable to the deductive, rationalist framework of 
judicial analysis.96 
B.  Dilution 
Dilution under federal law is defined as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous 
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services,”97 and the FTDA makes remedies available to 
the “owner of a famous mark” against another person’s commercial use of a mark that “causes 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark”.98 The FTDA’s limitation of the dilution remedy 
to famous marks has the effect of making the strength of the plaintiff’s mark not merely a factor 
in weighing the strength of a dilution claim (as it is in the likelihood of confusion analysis), but a 
necessary statutory element of a prima facie dilution case.99 Whether a dilution claim will 
 
96 See infra Part III. 
97 FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 4, 109 Stat. 985, 986 (1996), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1127 
(2005). 
98 Id. § 3(a), 109 Stat. at 985, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2005). 
99 Id.; see also Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 802 (6th Cir. 2004) (“To 
succeed in a federal dilution claim:  [T]he senior mark must be (1) famous….”), quoting Kellogg 
Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d at 616, 616 (6th Cir. 2003); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d Cir. 1999) (“We understand the FTDA to establish five necessary 
elements to a claim of dilution:  (1) the senior mark must be famous….”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra 
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actually suceed, however, depends on  other factors developed by the courts.  Historically, 
dilution has been understood as encompassing two classes of harm:  blurring and tarnishment. 
1.  Dilution by Blurring.—Early judicial efforts to systematize federal dilution 
doctrine were generally confused and chaotic.  The first Court of Appeals cases focused almost 
exclusively on the fame of the plaintiff’s mark, the similarity of the defendant’s mark to the 
plaintiff’s mark, and the direct effects of such similarity on consumer reactions to the marks.100 
Then, in an apparent bid to do for the FTDA what Judge Friendly’s seminal opinion in Polaroid 
did for the Lanham Act, the Second Circuit enunciated a sprawling ten-factor test for dilution by 
blurring in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.101 Yet where Judge Friendly’s opinion drew from a 
long history of analysis and study embodied in the Restatement of Torts,102 the Nabisco factors 
 
note 14, at § 24:89, page 24-158 (“The elements of a prima facie case for an injunction against 
dilution…[include that t]he plaintiff is the owner of a mark which qualifies as a ‘famous’ 
mark….”).  Although there are statutory criteria for assessing fame within the FTDA, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H), most authorities treat the requirement of fame as requiring the same type of 
mark strength as is measured under an infringement analysis, only to a higher degree.  See, e.g.,
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 97-98 (2d Cir.  2001); 4 
MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:91.1, page 24-181.  Indeed, the statutory factors for 
determining fame under the FTDA overlap considerably with judicially crafted factors for 
determining secondary meaning.  Compare 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)-(H) (setting forth eight 
factors for determining fame including duration and extent of use, scope of advertising, level of 
recognition, and the nature and extent of use of similar marks by others); with Centaur 
Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 1222 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(setting forth six factors for determining secondary meaning, including length and exclusivity of 
use, advertising expenditures, consumer studies establishing recognition, and attempts to 
plagiarize the mark). 
100 See, e.g., Ringling Bros. v. Utah Division of Trav. Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 458 (4th Cir. 
1999); Luigino's, Inc v. Stouffer Corp., 170 F.3d 827, 832-33 (8th Cir. 1999). 
101 191 F.3d 208, 217-22 (2d Cir. 1999). 
102 See Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elec. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961), citing 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 729-31. 
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appear to have been plucked from thin air,103 by a court that practically admitted it did not fully 
understand what dilution is.104 The Nabisco court was roundly criticized for confusing dilution 
with infringement, and including factors in its analysis that were more suited to the latter concept 
than the former.105 Moreover, the Nabisco court split from an earlier Fourth Circuit decision that 
had held that the FTDA required a plaintiff to prove actual dilution and economic harm in order 
to prevail, as opposed to mere likelihood of dilution.106 Over the next few years, the Sixth 
Circuit essentially adopted Nabisco in its first case under the FTDA107 and the Third Circuit 
collated the Nabisco test with an earlier Second Circuit test for state-law dilution claims,108 
deepening the confusion among the circuits. 
The Supreme Court first stepped into the fray in 2003 in the case of Moseley v. V 
Secret Catalogue.109 The Moseley Court, resolving the aforementioned split between the Second 
 
103 Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 217 (stating that the factors the court was using to weigh the 
plaintiff’s dilution claim were “the factors that appear pertinent on these particular facts”). 
104 Id. (“It is not yet entirely clear how courts should determine whether a junior use causes a 
senior mark to suffer dilution.”), citing Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 625 
(2d Cir. 1983) (“[D]ilution remains a somewhat nebulous concept.”). 
105 See, e.g., 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:94.4, pages 24-210 to 24-214; Autozone,
373 F.3d at 804-05 & n.4; I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49-50 (1st Cir. 
1998) (criticizing some factors applied by the Second Circuit in a dilution case under New York 
law, which factors also appeared in the Nabisco test). 
106 Compare Nabisco, 191 F.3d at 223-25 (holding that only likelihood of dilution need be 
proven for a plaintiff to prevail under the FTDA); with Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458-61 
(holding that an FTDA claim requires proof of “actual, consummated dilution”, and indeed, 
proof of actual economic harm). 
107 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476 (6th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 537 U.S. 
418 (2003). 
108 Times Mirror Magazine v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2000). 
109 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003). 
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and Fourth Circuits, held that to prevail under the FTDA a plaintiff must prove “actual dilution”, 
not mere “likelihood of dilution”, although actual economic harm need not be proven.110 
However, where the Fourth Circuit’s requirement of “actual, consummated dilution” had been 
premised on an understanding of dilution as a harm caused by “a sufficient similarity between 
the junior and senior marks to evoke an ‘instinctive mental association’ of the two by a relevant 
universe of consumers,”111 the Moseley Court criticized this view.  The Court reasoned that “the 
mere fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with a famous mark” was 
insufficient to establish actionable dilution because it “will not necessarily reduce the capacity of 
the famous mark to identify the goods of its owner, the statutory requirement for dilution under 
the FTDA.”112 According to Moseley, reduction of the capacity of plaintiff’s mark to identify 
plaintiff’s goods is to dilution by blurring under the FTDA as likelihood of confusion is to 
infringement under the Lanham Act; consumer association of the defendant’s mark with the 
plaintiff’s mark is not sufficient to prove an FTDA claim, and may not even be relevant to such a 
claim.  Under Moseley, dilution by blurring has little to do with consumer reaction to the 
defendant’s mark, and everything to do with consumer reaction to the plaintiff’s mark in a world 
where the defendant’s mark exists. 
This feature of the Moseley opinion would seem to mark an inflection point in the 
theoretical tug-o’-war over dilution doctrine.  The Moseley Court essentially rejected the free-
riding theory of dilution implied by the Fourth Circuit’s “instinctive mental association” test—
 
110 Id. at 432-33. 
111 Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458. 
112 Id. at 433. 
33 
and by the legislative history of the FTDA—in favor of a dilution doctrine that hews as closely 
as possible to uniqueness theory embodied in the statutory text.  By taking literally the FTDA’s 
uniqueness-based description of the dilution injury, the Moseley Court made explicit the internal 
contradictions of dilution doctrine that Congress (and earlier, Schechter) had attempted to dodge.  
Although Congress may have intended to promulgate a free-riding theory of dilution113—and 
may still have that intent114—the Supreme Court has obliged (or perhaps dared) Congress to 
make that intent explicit in statutory language.  In order to do so, Congress would have to finally 
acknolwedge what Schechter could not:  that the policy underlying the free-riding theory of 
dilution is essentially an extension of traditional common-law infringement policy beyond the 
formalist limits set by the Trademark Cases and their progeny.  The traditional concept of 
“passing off” envisions an unauthorized use of a mark that deceives the consumer into 
purchasing a second comer’s goods instead of the trademark owner’s; the primary distinction 
between this scenario and free-riding dilution is that in the latter instance the “free ride” does not 
result in the substitution of a sale of defendant’s products for a sale of plaintiff’s products (by 
 
113 See supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
114 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. H2122 (Apr. 19, 2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) 
(stating, in the context of a proposed amendment to the FTDA, “Unfortunately, there are those in 
both commercial and noncommercial settings who would seize upon the popularity of a 
trademark for their own purposes and at the expense of the rightful owner and the public”).  
Congress is not alone in subscribing to the free-riding theory of dilution.  See, e.g., Beebe et al., 
supra note 5, at 881-83 (characterizing dilution as a doctrine within a historical chain of 
equitable trademark decisions guarding against misappropriation of goodwill); I.P. Lund Trading 
ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (1st Cir. 1998) (“[I]t appears that an entirely different issue is 
at stake [in the plaintiff’s dilution claim]—not interference with the source signaling function but 
rather protection from an appropriation of or free riding on the investment Lund has made in its 
design.”); cf. Allied Maintenance Corp. v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 
1165 (1977) (noting that New York’s dilution statute was designed to curb the “cancer-like 
growth of dissimilar products or services which feed[] upon the business reputation of an 
established distinctive trade-mark or name.”). 
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reason of the absence of market proximity).  To the extent that this free-riding theory of dilution 
law had any currency, the Moseley Court’s elimination of mental association between the parties’ 
marks as a sufficient basis for a dilution claim would seem to refute the theory for purposes of 
the FTDA as currently enacted. 
Although the Moseley Court was clear about what constitutes dilution and what 
does not, it did not indicate how reduction in the source-identifying capacity of a plaintiff’s mark 
could be proven.  It merely suggested that “direct evidence of dilution such as consumer surveys 
will not be necessary if actual dilution can reliably be proved through circumstantial evidence--
the obvious case is one where the junior and senior marks are identical.”115 Thus, the only proxy 
for reduction of source-identifying capacity offered by the Supreme Court is similarity of 
marks—albeit only in the unique case of perfect similarity.  Since Moseley, no Court of Appeals 
has developed additional proxies for dilution, but the Sixth Circuit has suggested that the 
Nabisco factors are unlikely to have continued validity,116 the Second Circuit has held that 
identity of marks is sufficient to raise a presumption of dilution,117 the Ninth Circuit has punted 
the question of how to prove dilution to the Central District of California,118 and the Seventh 
Circuit has demurred that whatever evidence might be relevant to a dilution claim under 
Moseley, no such evidence had been presented in the case before it.119 As of this writing, the 
 
115 Id. at 434. 
116 Autozone, Inc. v. Tandy Corp., 373 F.3d 786, 804-05 (6th Cir. 2004). 
117 Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 453 (2d Cir. 2004). 
118 Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1014-15 (9th Cir. 2004). 
119 Ty Inc. v. Softbelly's Inc., 353 F.3d 528, 535-36 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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only factor that federal courts will definitely consider probative of dilution by blurring—other 
than direct proof of blurring in the form of consumer surveys—is similarity of the marks, and 
even then only a high degree of similarity (i.e., identity) will do.120 
2.  Dilution by Tarnishment.—Moseley hinted that tarnishment might not be 
actionable under the FTDA, but did not squarely rule on the question.121 However, federal courts 
had previously reasoned that the FTDA created a cause of action for dilution by tarnishment,122 
120 The amendment to the FTDA Congress is considering in response to Moseley would 
establish several factors as relevant to a finding of dilution by blurring, including similarity of 
the marks, the strength and degree of recognition of the plaintiff’s mark, the exclusivity of the 
plaintiff’s use of the mark, the intent of the defendant to create an association with the plaintiff’s 
mark, and the existence of any such association.  Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 
683, sec. 2(1), § (c)(2)(B), 109th Cong. (March 8, 2006).  Aside from expanding the evidentiary 
scope of a dilution case, this amendment would appear to represent a step back in the direction of 
the free riding theory of dilution that the Moseley Court rejected.  See also id. sec. 2(1), 
§ (c)(5)(B)(1) (providing for additional remedies if a dilution-by-blurring defendant “willfully 
intended to trade on the recognition of the famous mark”). 
121 Id.. at 432; but see id. at 436 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The Court's opinion does not 
foreclose injunctive relief if respondents on remand present sufficient evidence of either blurring 
or tarnishment.” (internal citations omitted)). 
122 See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 466 (7th Cir. 2000) 
(“Courts recognize two principal forms of dilution: tarnishing and blurring.”), citing Panavision 
Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1326 n. 7 (9th Cir. 1998); Ringling Bros. v. Utah Division 
of Trav. Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (“the [FTDA’s] legislative history further indicates 
that Congress understood that ‘dilution’ might result either from ‘uses that blur the 
distinctiveness of [a famous] mark or [that] tarnish or disparage it.’”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 
14, at § 24:95, page 14-219 & nn.16-20 (collecting cases in which a dilution by tarnishment 
claim was upheld under the FTDA).  Professor McCarthy has argued based on trademark theory 
and legislative history that a cause of action for tarnishment lies under the FTDA, see id. at 
§ 24:95, pages 14-216 to 14-218, and Congress is taking steps to make the availability of a 
federal remedy for tarnishment more explicit, see Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, 
H.R. 683, sec. 2(1), § (c)(1), 109th Cong. (2005) (“the owner of a famous mark…shall be 
entitled to an injunction against another person who…commences use of a mark or trade name in 
commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment….” (emphasis 
added)). 
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and they are familiar with tarnishment doctrine under analogous state dilution statutes.123 
Dilution by tarnishment can be generally defined as a commercial use of a famous mark by 
someone other than the mark owner that threatens to displace positive associations of the mark 
with negative ones.124 As with dilution by blurring, a famous (i.e., strong) mark is a required 
element of a tarnishment claim.125 It is also apparent that similarity of the defendant’s mark to 
the plaintiff’s mark is a factor in determining whether tarnishment exists.126 The only other clear 
requirement of a tarnishment claim is that the defendant’s use must somehow involve shoddy 
goods or unsavory activity; the most typical examples involve the use of a famous mark in a 
context that suggests sexual activity or drug use.127 In short, a claim for dilution by tarnishment 
 
123 See, e.g., Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 
1996) (analyzing tarnishment under New York’s dilution statute, then-N.Y. Gen. Bus. L. § 368-d 
[now § 360-l]). 
124 See, e.g., id. (“The sine qua non of tarnishment is a finding that plaintiff's mark will 
suffer negative associations through defendant's use.”); Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 466 (“Dilution by 
tarnishing occurs when a junior mark's similarity to a famous mark causes consumers mistakenly 
to associate the famous mark with the defendant's inferior or offensive product.”); New York 
Stock Exchange, Inc. v. New York, New York Hotel, LLC, 293 F.3d 550, 558 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(“Tarnishment [under the New York dilution statute] occurs where a trademark is "linked to 
products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context," with the 
result that the public will associate the lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods 
with the plaintiff's unrelated goods.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Avery Dennison Corp. 
v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 881 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Tarnishment occurs when a defendant's use of a 
mark similar to a plaintiff's presents a danger that consumers will form unfavorable associations 
with the mark.”); Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, H.R. 683, sec. 2(1), § (c)(2)(C), 
109th Cong. (2005) (defining dilution by tarnishment as “association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous 
mark.”); 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 24:95, page 24-214 (“Tarnishment can arise where 
the effect of the defendant’s unauthorized use is to dilute by tarnishing or degrading positive 
associations of the mark and thereby to dilute the distinctive quality of the mark.”). 
125 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
126 See, e.g., Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 466; Avery Dennison, 189 F.3d at 881. 
127 See, e.g., V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 477 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(agreeing with the district court that defendant’s inventory of adult videos, sex toys and other 
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will be analyzed using similar factors to a claim for dilution by blurring, with the added 
requirement of some negative connotation to the defendant’s use of the accused mark.  This 
overlap suggests a conceptual affinity between the doctrines of blurring and tarnishment:  where 
the latter seeks to prevent persons other than the trademark owner from creating negative
associations with the owner’s mark, the former seeks to prevent persons other than the trademark 
owner from creating any associations with the owner’s mark that would compete with the 
association between the mark and its owner’s goods.  As will be shown in Parts III and IV below, 
these related policies are in turn connected to the anti-confusion policy of infringement law, and 
juxtaposition of the doctrines—including the proxy factors by which they are analyzed—suggest 
a more generalized theory of trademark law rooted in the cognitive psychology of consumer 
behavior. 
C.  Summary 
This Part has identified a limited set of factors that inform the analysis of all 
trademark claims.  Whether a claim is brought for infringement or dilution, the strength of the 
plaintiff’s mark and the similarity of the defendant’s mark to the plaintiff’s mark will always be a 
factor in deciding the claim.  For dilution by tarnishment claims, there is an added requirement 
 
adult novelties was sufficient to support a tarnishment claim), rev’d on other grounds, 537 U.S. 
418 (2003); Kraft Foods Hldgs., Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949-50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) 
(holding that the use of the names “VelVeeda” and “King Velveeda” on  on a website of sexually 
explicit images and references to drug use tarnished the “Velveeta” trademark); Hasbro, Inc. v. 
Internet Ent. Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479, 1480 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (finding that the 
Internet domain address “candyland.com” on an adult website tarnished the “CANDY-LAND” 
board game trademark); Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.Supp. 1183, 1191-93 
(E.D.N.Y. 1972) (holding under the New York dilution statute that the “Coca-Cola” mark was 
diluted by defendant's modification of a Coca-Cola advertisement in a poster which altered the 
text to read “Cocaine”). 
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that the defendant’s use threaten to generate a negative association with the plaintiff’s mark.  
And for infringement claims, courts will also consider the proximity of the markets in which the 
parties’ marks appear and the likely degree of consumer care.  The fact that the three legal 
standards for federal trademark claims—likelihood of confusion for infringement, reduction of 
the capacity of plaintiff’s mark to identify plaintiff’s goods for dilution by blurring, and creation 
of negative associations with plaintiff’s mark for dilution by tarnishment—are all determined by 
analysis of this limited and overlapping set of proxy factors suggests a deeper connection 
between the various species of liability.  Indeed, as the next Part will show, the current legal 
regime is something of an inversion:  the proxy factors are directly linked to the harms at issue in 
trademark cases, and the diverging legal standards governing the various species of liability are 
best understood as rationalist efforts to discuss these harms, which operate at a decidedly non-
rational level. 
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III.  The Cognitive Psychology of Trademarks and Consumer Decisionmaking
Although the doctrines of infringement and dilution have developed separately, 
and indeed often in tension with one another, if one examines them in the abstract it becomes 
apparent that they are really flip sides of the same coin.  The doctrines discussed in the previous 
Part are all centrally concerned with a specific cognitive process, i.e., the effect of the sensory 
stimulus of a trademark on the mental processes of actual or potential consumers.  This effect 
can be understood as an interconnected set of heuristics and related idiosyncracies of human 
memory, cognition, and decisionmaking.  While trademark doctrine ostensibly concerns itself 
with the consumer’s perception of the relationship between trademarked products and their 
manufacturers, we have seen that courts tend not to concern themselves as much with this 
relationship as with a fairly narrow set of proxy criteria.  This Part will demonstrate that judicial 
constructs such as likelihood of confusion, reduction in the capacity of a mark to identify the 
goods of its owner, and creation of associations that harm the reputation of a mark—insofar as 
they purport to address the effect of a trademark on a consumer’s belief as to the relationship 
between mark and maker, rather than consumer reaction to the mark itself—are merely rationally 
cognizable proxies for the manipulations to which the non-rational cognitive processes triggered 
by trademarks are particularly susceptible. 
As an introduction to this hypothesis, readers may wish to perform a brief self-
assessment as follows:  Typically, when I see a can with the words “Coca-Cola” emblazoned on 
it in white script against a red background, do I run through a linear mental process on the order 
of: “That logo is a trademark of the Coca-Cola Company, whose products I have used in the past 
and found to be (un)satisfactory and (un)pleasant, therefore this product which bears the same 
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logo must also be a product of the Coca-Cola Company (or otherwise affiliated with or approved 
by that company), and because that company is likely to strive for consistency across the 
products to which it affixes its trademark, this product is likely to be (un)satisfactory and 
(un)pleasant to me”?  Or rather, when confronted with such a stimulus, does a general 
impression of (un)pleasantness and (un)desirability simply present itself in my consciousness 
through no deliberate mental effort on my part?  For readers who have the former reaction (if any 
exist), the arguments presented herein will likely be unpersuasive.  But for readers who have the 
latter reaction, this Part will suggest an explanation why. 
Let us begin with the unremarkable assumption that a consumer facing a purchase 
decision will select a purchase opition that she believes is most likely to satisfy her needs or 
wants.  The specific needs or wants at issue are not particularly material for present purposes; 
they could include such disparate criteria as value for the dollar, suitability for a specific 
purpose, capacity to provide some sort of physical, psychological, or emotional enjoyment, or 
even social prestige or distinction.  How is our hypothetcial consumer to determine which 
particular product from among all her choices is most likely to satisfy her needs or wants?  She 
will usually not be permitted to sample or test the various products, and will thus lack direct 
evidence from which to rationally deduce their relative capacity to satisfy her criteria.  When 
faced with such uncertainty, human beings tend to estimate the attribute they are trying to 
measure—the target attribute, in this case the criteria our hypothetical consumer deems 
important—by reference to a related attribute—a substitute attribute—that they feel they can 
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measure.128 These substitute attributes are often determined by means of heuristics.129 And in 
the case of our hypothetical consumer, there are obvious stimuli available to trigger and channel 
her heuristic judgments:  trademarks.130 
Courts dealing with trademark cases have developed and applied the proxy factors 
discussed in the previous Part as metrics for the proper boundaries of trademark liability, even 
though those proxy factors do not speak directly to the ostensible subject of trademark doctrine:  
consumer perceptions of the relationship between a marked product and the mark owner.  This 
disconnect suggests that the proxy factors may play some role in the cognitive processes 
triggered by a trademark, which in turn reflect some feature of consumer psychology other than 
a belief as to the relationship between a marked product and a manufacturer.  Viewing the proxy 
factors through the lens of cognitive psychology, their role and the potential reasons why courts 
may consider them important begin to emerge.  Each of these proxies—similarity of marks, 
proximity of markets, strength of marks, degree of consumer care, and negative associations—
can be understood as reflecting non-rational features of human cognition, which influence 
consumer decisionmaking in predictable ways.  Taken together, these cognitive processes 
 
128 See Daniel Kahneman & Shane Frederick, Representativeness Revisited:  Attribute 
Substitution in Intuitive Judgment, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 10, at 49, 53-56. 
129 See id. at 53-56. 
130 This is not to say that consumers will always base their purchasing decisions solely on 
their response to a trademark.  Other factors—price, for example—will come into play.  But 
insofar as the trademark function is a model of the effect of trademarks on consumer behavior, 
the discussion herein will focus on those effects to the exclusion of other potential influences on 
consumer behavior.  In this respect the trademark response is closely related—albeit not 
identical—to the marketing concept of “brand equity,” defined as “the differential effect of brand 
knowledge on consumer response to the marketing of the brand.”  Kevin Lane Keller, 
Conceptualizing, Measuring, and Managing Customer-Based Brand Equity, 57 J. MARKETING 1, 
2 (1993). 
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suggest a structure within which certain market behaviors will generate an improperly biased 
consumer response to a trademark—that is, a response that is the product of empirically unlikely 
or erroneous consumer beliefs.  It is these undesirable responses, and the purchase decisions they 
cause, that trademark law seeks to prevent, by imposing liability against the market behaviors 
that generate them. 
A.  Substitution of Attributes and Negative Associations:  The Affect Heuristic and Choosing by 
Liking. 
The discussion above implies the existence of substitute attributes that inform 
consumer choice in the absence of information to guide rational decisionmaking.  A likely 
candidate for generating such a substitute attribute is the affect heuristic.131 Based on a variety 
of experimental studies, psychology researchers have concluded that choices and judgments are 
often made based on automatically generated valences of positive or negative affective 
responses—emotional states experienced as a sense of goodness or badness concerning a given 
stimulus.132 Put simply, we choose what we like, and only after we have decided do we 
 
131 Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 128, at 57 (“Affective valence is a natural assessment, 
and therefore a candidate for substitution in the numerous situations in which an affectively 
loaded response is required.”); see Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism 
Seriously:  The Problem Of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 732-33 (1999) 
(hereinafter “Hanson & Kysar I”) (“[O]ur affective responses to products more often than not 
determine the purchasing decision, regardless of whether we experience the decision as having 
resulted from ‘reasons.’”). 
132 See Shane Frederick, Automated Choice Heuristics, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra 
note 10, at 548, 553 (describing the use of this heuristic as a means of generating choices without 
deliberate reasoning); Paul Slovic, Melissa Finucane, Ellen Peters, & Donald G. MacGregor, The 
Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 10, at 397 (describing the affect heuristic 
and the empirical data from which it is inferred). 
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retroactively try to rationalize our decision.133 It is hypothesized that the emotional component 
of our experiences with a given stimulus “tags” that stimulus with affective content, either 
consciously or unconsciously, and the pool of these affective “tags” is automatically drawn on 
whenever that stimulus is encountered again.134 So for example, drinking a cold beverage on a 
hot day, getting a product recall notice, seeing an aesthetically pleasing advertisement, or reading 
a news report that a household product contains a potent carcinogen, are all experiences that 
would modify the affect pool for the products and trademarks involved,135 and accordingly 
increase or decrease the value of the trademark response to those products and trademarks. 
How can we be confident that our hypothetical consumer will rely on an intuitive 
sense of affect rather than a more structured reasoning process in making her purchase decision?  
Experimental data suggest the existence of two parallel systems of human reasoning—one 
 
133 See Frederick, supra note 132, at 550 (describing the affect heuristic as “choosing by 
liking”); see also R. B. Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Preferences Need No Inferences, 35 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 151, 155 (1980) (“Quite often, ‘I decided in favor of X’ is no more than ‘I liked 
X.’ . . . We buy the cars we ‘like,’ choose the jobs and houses we find ‘attractive,’ and then 
justify these choices by various reasons.”). 
134 See Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 132, at 400; see also Tim Ambler 
et al., Salience and Choice:  Neural Correlates of Shopping Decisions, 21 PSYCHOLOGY &
MARKETING 247, 256 (2004) (discussing neural activation patterns during consumer choice tasks 
that suggest the visual stimuli of trademarks trigger “semantic processing and the memory-based 
interpretation of visually presented material,” and that “such memories are complex with 
episodic and, in many cases, affective and cognitive elements…[and] probably involve actual 
experience of purchasing, usage, or seeing advertisements.”). 
135 See Ambler et al., supra note 134, at 256.  In fact, research has shown that people tend to 
intuitively believe there is an inverse correlation between risk and benefit, so positive affective 
feelings can lead a person to underestimate the risk of the stimulus that generates such feelings, 
while awareness of even small risks can result in outsized reductions in the perceived benefits of 
the source of that risk.  Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 132, at 410-414.  
Professors Hanson and Kysar have noted that this feature of human decisionmaking leads 
inevitably to manipulative market behavior in the form of affect-laden advertising for risky 
products such as cigarettes.  Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 131, at 732-33. 
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automatic and associative and the other deliberate and rule-based—that work simultaneously and 
interactively to complete cognitive tasks.136 From what we know about human cognition, 
associative (as opposed to linear or logical) judgments such as affective response are often 
automatic,137 and “tagging” a stimulus with affect is an extraordinarily easy task.138 Moreover, 
such judgments are difficult to displace with subsequent logical reasoning, which is cognitively 
demanding and slow.139 Experimental data have shown that the affect heuristic is persistent:  
once a stimulus has been tagged with an affective value, later contrary information about the 
stimulus’s actual meaning or significance will often be insufficient to significantly alter the 
 
136 Sloman, supra note 137, at 380-84.  For example, Sloman points to experimental results 
that show test subjects simultaneously believing two contradictory responses to a test question—
one founded on associative judgments of similarity and the other on logical rules of 
probability—as evidence of the two-systems theory.  Id. at 385-91; see generally Ulrike Hahn & 
Nick Chater, Similarity and Rules:  Distinct?  Exhaustive?  Empirically Distinguishable?, 65
COGNITION 197 (1998) (discussing theoretical and empirical distinctions between rule-based and 
similarity-based cognitive processes). 
137 See Steven A. Sloman, Two Systems of Reasoning, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra 
note 10, at 379, 380-84 & tbl. 22.1 (arguing that “associative” reasoning, which governs 
associative memory functions, is an automatic form of cognitive processing, to be distinguished 
from “rule-based” reasoning, which governs more formal logical analysis and requires deliberate 
sequential processing); id. at 393-94.  But see Gerd Gigerenzer & Terry Regier, How Do We Tell 
an Association From a Rule?  Comment on Sloman (1996), 119 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN 23, 
23-26 (1996) (critiquing Sloman's dual-system theory on grounds of ambiguity, vagueness, and 
failure to consider alternative explanations of data). 
138 As an illustration of our unconscious sucsceptibility to affective content, consider a study 
that showed that flashing an affectively charged image (a smiling or frowning face) for 1/250th 
of a second immediately prior to the display of a stimulus was enough to bias the test subject’s 
preference for that stimulus, even though this the affectively charged “priming” cue was so brief 
that there was no recognition or recall of it.  This effect persisted even when the stimulus was 
later presented with an affectively opposite “priming” cue.  Slovic, Finucane, Peters & 
MacGregor, supra note 132, at 401 (citing P. Winkielman, R.B. Zajonc, & N. Schwarz, 
Subliminal Affective Priming Resists Attributional Interventions, 11 COGNITION & EMOTION 433 
(1997)). 
139 See infra § III.B.3. 
45 
affective response.140 Indeed, when we rely on any heuristic judgment in our decisionmaking, it 
takes considerable time and effort to alter those judgments based on further, more rational 
consideration, if we alter them at all.141 Put simply, “people are not accustomed to thinking hard, 
and are often content to trust a plausible judgment that quickly comes to mind.”142 Thus, 
particularly in those purchasing contexts where the purchase is not considered for a long period 
of time,143 initial intuitive judgments—such as affective reactions to a trademark—are extremely 
likely to form the sole basis for the ultimate purchasing decision.  Consumer psychologists 
studying the purchasing decision have reached similar conclusions.144 
140 For example, in one experiment test subjects were given an affectively charged definition 
for Chinese pictograms, then told that those definitions were inaccurate and asked to memorize 
“accurate” affectively neutral definitions for the same pictograms.  Even after the new affectively 
neutral meanings had been learned, the test subjects continued to exhibit the earlier affective 
reaction to the pictograms.  Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 132, at 401. 
141 See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 131, at 646-54 (discussing a host of empirically 
demonstrated phenomena illustrating the general principle that initial judgments are extremely 
persistent, even in the face of contradictory or ambiguous hard data).  Surprisingly, attempts at 
rationalization may actually serve to increase confidence in a faulty intuitive judgment, a 
phenomenon known as confirmation bias.  See id. at 660-62; Nicholas Epley & Thomas 
Gilovich, The Anchoring-and-Adjustment Heuristic:  Why the Adjustments are Insufficient, 17
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE 311, 312 (2006) (“[P]eople evaluate hypotheses by trying to confirm 
them.”).  For a general overview of the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of the 
confirmatory bias, see Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 131, at 647-650. 
142 Kahneman & Frederick, supra note 128, at 58.  See also id. at 57 (“[P]eople initially 
believe whatever they are told… it takes some time and mental effort to ‘unbelieve’ such 
dubious statements.”).  Cf. generally Christian D. Schunn et al., To Calculate or Not to 
Calculate:  A Source Activation Confusion Model of Problem Familiarity’s Role in Strategy 
Selection, 23 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 3 (1997) 
(demonstrating that people tend to retrieve answers to problems from memory, rather than 
calculate them through logical reasoning, when the problem appears familiar to them). 
143 See infra § III.B.3. 
144 See generally, e.g., Girish N. Punj & Clayton L. Hillyer, A Cognitive Model of Customer-
Based Brand Equity for Frequently Purchased Products:  Conceptual Framework and Empirical 
Results, 14 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 124 (2004) (formulating and empirically testing a model 
of brand equity that is dominated by affectively-laden “global brand attitude” and “brand 
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The influence of affect and the related phenomenon of “choosing by liking” on 
purchase decisions begins to shed light on some of the proxy factors identified in the previous 
Part.  First of all, the relevance of negative associations to claims for dilution by tarnishment 
becomes clear.  By altering the affective “pool” for a given trademark, uses that generate 
negative associations lessen the chance that consumers will choose products bearing that 
trademark.  The “choosing by liking” model also suggests roles for the proxy factors dealing 
with mark strength and consumer care, which are discussed below. 
B.  Mark Strength:  Recognition, Recall, and Familiarity. 
When courts talk about the strength of a plaintiff’s trademark, they are referring to 
three related legal concepts:  inherent distinctiveness, acquired distinctiveness (also known as 
secondary meaning), and fame.145 Inherent distinctiveness is a judgment about the uniqueness of 
a trademark in the context of the category of goods on which it is used.  Terms that refer to the 
genus of which a particular product is a species (such as “car” and “cola”) are “generic,” and 
 
heuristic” as first- and second-level determinants, respectively, of consumer decisionmaking); 
Ambler et al., supra note 134, at 248 (summarizing research suggesting that emotion and 
feelings are the primary drivers of consumer decisionmaking).  But see Ambler et al., supra note 
134, at 257 (noting that brain imaging neither supported nor refuted neurophysiological 
predictions of one theorist of emotion-based choice). 
145 Courts rely on concepts of distinctiveness not only in determining liability, but also in 
determining whether a trademark is entitled to protection in the first place.  Two Pesos, Inc. v. 
Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992) (“The general rule regarding distinctiveness is 
clear: An identifying mark is distinctive and capable of being protected if it either (1) is 
inherently distinctive or (2) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning.”).  For 
purposes of this Article, however, the relevance of these concepts lies in their effect on 
determinations of liability for a defendant’s use, not their effect on the protectability of a 
plaintiff’s mark.  
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therefore not entitled to trademark protection.146 At the other end of the distinctiveness spectrum 
are “arbitrary” words that bear no logical relationship to the product they are affixed to (such as 
“Camel” for cigarettes or “Apple” for computers), and “fanciful” words that have been coined 
specifically for trademark use (such as “Kodak” or “Xerox”).147 Such terms are entitled to 
vigorous trademark protection.148 In between these extremes are “descriptive” marks—terms 
that describe the products to which they are affixed (such as “Tasty” for food products or 
“Bright” for flashlights)—and “suggestive” marks—terms that suggest a conclusion about the 
nature of the goods to which they are affixed but require some thought to reach that conclusion 
(such as “Tide” for laundry detergent or “Coppertone” for suntan lotion).  “Suggestive” marks 
are generally subject to protection, although they are not considered as strong as arbitrary or 
fanciful marks, while “descriptive” marks are even weaker, and are entitled to protection only 
upon a showing of “acquired distinctiveness” or “secondary meaning”, the second metric of 
mark strength.149 
146 Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).  Terms 
that may once have signified a particular manufacturer’s product but have come, over time, to 
refer to an entire category of products -- such as “aspirin,” “cellophane,” and “thermos” -- are 
also considered “generic”.  Id.at 10 (citing Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co., 272 F. 505 (2d Cir. 
1921); DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 85 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 299
U.S. 601 (1936); King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Industries, Inc., 321 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 
1963)). 
147 Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11 & n.12. 
148 See, e.g., Virgin Enters. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 147 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he law accords 
broad, muscular protection to marks that are arbitrary or fanciful in relation to the products on 
which they are used.”). 
149 See Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 10-11. 
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The Supreme Court has held that a trademark has attained “acquired 
distinctiveness”—also known as secondary meaning—when, “in the minds of the public, the 
primary significance of [the mark] is to identify the source of the product rather than the product 
itself”150—yet another example of the doctrinal preoccupation with the nexus of mark and maker.  
In addition to direct evidence of such a nexus in the minds of the public (such as testimony or 
consumer surveys), courts trying to determine whether a mark has attained secondary meaning 
consider a variety of proxy factors such as the length and exclusivity of the plaintiff’s use of the 
mark, the plaintiff’s advertising efforts, publicity surrounding the mark, and the sales success of 
the plaintiff’s products bearing the mark.151 As with the proxy factors under the various tests for 
liability, the proxy factors for secondary meaning have little to do with the nexus between a mark 
an a maker.  To the contrary, they all relate to facts that would influence the probability of a 
significant number of actual or potential consumers having some exposure to the plaintiff’s 
mark, either on the plaintiff’s products or in advertising and publicity (and the frequency of such 
exposure).152 While such exposures may say nothing about consumer awareness of the 
 
150 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000) (quoting Inwood 
Laboratories, Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n. 11 (1982)).  The Court 
continues to invoke this definition of secondary meaning despite an apparent effort by Congress 
to refine the formulation, at least insofar as it pertains to the doctrine of genericness.  See note 
62, supra.
151 See, e.g., Centaur Communications, Ltd. v. A/S/M Communications, Inc., 830 F.2d 1217, 
1222 (2d Cir. 1987); Mktg. Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 
1999), rev'd on other grounds, 532 U.S. 23 (2001); Co-Rect Prods. v. Marvy! Advertising, 780
F.2d 1324, 1332-33 (8th Cir. 1985); Pebble Beach Co. v. Tour 18 I Limited, 155 F.3d 526, 541 
(5th Cir. 1998); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 998 n.12 (7th 
Cir. 1989). 
152 Indeed, the “sales success” factor is likely directly linked to affective response, insofar as 
widespread and repeated purchases of a product imply satisfaction with the product and, 
concurrently, a positive affective response to its trademark in a large number of consumers. 
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relationship between a mark and a manufacturer, they may contribute to the “affect pool” of the 
mark in the mind of consumers, as well as provide more specific knowledge concerning the 
products to which the mark is affixed that can be drawn on in future decisionmaking.153 
Moreover, as will be demonstrated below, simple repetition of such exposure may itself 
influence consumer responses to the mark. 
The third and final metric of mark strength—fame—is relevant only to dilution 
claims, but is closely related to the other metrics.  Indeed, the text of the FTDA explicitly states 
that the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of a mark is a relevant consideration in 
determining whether the mark is “famous.”154 Moreover, the other factors the FTDA lists as 
relevant to a finding of fame are largely duplicative of the judicially-developed factors for 
determining secondary meaning.155 While a heightened showing under these factors may be 
necessary to support a finding of fame,156 the difference between fame and secondary meaning 
would appear to be one of degree, rather than kind. 
 
153 Such specific knowledge may form “associative networks” around the mark in memory 
that are activated when encountering the mark.  See Jacob Jacoby, The Psychological 
Foundations of Trademark Law:  Secondary Meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and 
Dilution, 91 TRADEMARK REPORTER 1013, 1018-26 (2001).  However, such networks likely play 
only a subordinate role in consumer decisionmaking.  See infra notes 166-167 and accompanying 
text. 
154 FTDA, Pub. L. No. 104-98, sec. 3, § (c)(1)(A), 109 Stat. 985, 985 (1996), codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A) (2005). 
155 See note 99, supra.
156 See, e.g., Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 449 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that, to 
qualify as “famous” under the FTDA, a mark must possess “a high degree of … acquired 
distinctiveness” (emphasis omitted)), quoting TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc.,
244 F.3d 88, 98 (2d Cir. 2001). 
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What these authorities demonstrate, then, is that there are two types of mark 
strength.  The first measures the relative uniqueness of a mark in the context of the category of 
goods in which it is used.  The second measures the likelihood that consumers and potential 
consumers will be familiar with the mark through direct contact with it in the marketplace or in 
advertising and publicity.  Both these concepts of mark strength can be incorporated into a model 
of consumer decisionmaking based on affective response to trademarks, when viewed in light of 
research into human memory. 
1.  Inherent Distinctiveness and the Recognition Heuristic—Much research on 
human memory has focused on the distinction between two specific and—interestingly—
independent memory tasks:  recognition and recall.157 Recognition is described as the belief that 
one has encountered a stimulus in the past, whereas recall is the ability to retrieve the stimulus 
and contextual information about it from memory when given an appropriate cue.158 The first 
 
157 See, e.g., Gordon H. Bower, A Brief History of Memory Research, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF MEMORY 3, 16-19 (Endel Tulving & Fergus I. M. Craik eds., 2000) (discussing 
features of memory that have been the focus of recent study, including free recall, frequency, and 
recognition). 
158 In the context of consumer psychology, the distinction and its relevance to marketing 
strategy have been described as follows: 
Brand recognition relates to consumers’ ability to confirm prior exposure to the 
brand when given the brand as a cue.  In other words, brand recognition requires 
that consumers correctly discriminate the brand as having been seen or heard 
previously.  Brand recall relates to consumers’ ability to retrieve the brand when 
given the product category, the needs fulfilled by the cateogry, or some other type 
of probe as a cue.  In other words, brand recall requires that consumers correctly 
generate the brand from memory.  The relative importance of brand recall and 
recognition depends on the extent to which consumers make decisions in the store 
(where they potentially may be exposed to the brand) versus outside the store, 
among other factors.  Brand recognition may be more important to the extent that 
product decisions are made in the store. 
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measure of mark strength—uniqueness—is directly related to an interesting distinguishing 
feature of recognition and recall.  Studies have found that low-frequency words—i.e., words that 
are uncommon in ordinary usage—are more easily recognized when encountered after an initial 
exposure than are high-frequency words.159 The word-frequency effect on recall is precisely the 
opposite, but is less stable:  when presented with lists of either all high-frequency or all low-
frequency words, people tend to more accurately recall high-frequency words, but this effect all 
but disappears when both high- and low-frequency words are presented in a mixed list.160 
Applying these results to the trademark field, one can see how the judicially developed concept 
of inherent distinctiveness, with its focus on the uniqueness of a plaintiff’s chosen mark within 
its commercial context, reflects this feature of human memory.  One reason the law may be more 
protective of unique marks is that—absent any other measure of consumer reaction to a 
trademark (such as secondary meaning)—such marks, once encountered, are more likely to be 
recognized than non-unique marks (and no less likely to be recalled than non-unique marks when 
 
Keller, supra note 130, at 3 (internal citations omitted). 
159 See generally Victor H. Gregg, Word Frequency, Recognition and Recall, in RECALL 
AND RECOGNITION 183 (John Brown ed., 1976) (collecting research); Colin M. MacLeod & 
Kristina E. Kampe, Word Frequency Effects on Recall, Recognition, and Word Fragment 
Completion Tests, 22 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING, MEMORY & COGNITION 132, 
132 (1996) (same). 
160 MacLeod & Kampe, supra note 159, at 132-33. 
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presented in the same context as such non-unique marks).161 Another, possibly more potent 
explanation for the law’s preference for unique marks will be discussed below.162 
Although the word frequency effect gives some general insight into the relevance 
of recognition to inherent distinctiveness, it does not explain how a recognition-based theory of 
inherent distinctiveness would play a role in the consumer decisionmaking.  That gap can be 
filled by a feature of human cognition known as the recognition heuristic, which has been 
described as follows: 
Consider the task of inferring which of two objects has a higher value on some 
criterion (e.g., which is faster, higher, stronger).  The recognition heuristic for 
such tasks is simply stated:  If one of two objects is recognized and the other is 
not, then infer that the recognized object has the higher value.163 
The existence of this heuristic has been borne out by empirical data, but it is limited in that it is 
believed to be triggered only in cases where (a) the decisionmaker recognizes the stimulus but 
does not have any additional information about it, and (b) recognition is intuitively perceived to 
have some correlation to the target attribute.164 Nevertheless, it seems a good fit for the case of 
our hypothetical consumer from the discussion above, in those instances where she has no 
distinguishing information about the products she is considering other than their brand names.  
 
161 See Keller, supra note 130, at 9 (“[C]hoosing a familiar word representing a well-known 
concept or some other common object or property as a brand name may facilitate brand recall, 
but … choosing a more unusual or distinctive word may facilitate brand recognition.”). 
162 See Part IV.B, infra.
163 GERD GIGERENEZER, PETER M. TODD, & THE ABC RESEARCH GROUP, SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART, at 41 (1999). 
164 See generally Daniel G. Goldstein & Gerd Gigerenzer, Models of Ecological Rationality: 
The Recognition Heuristic, 109 PSYCHOLOGICAL REV. 75 (2002) (setting forth the empirical and 
theoretical bases for the recognition heuristic). 
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All else being equal, if she recognizes a trademark affixed to one such product but not the others, 
we would expect her to select the product whose trademark she recognized, even if she knew 
nothing else about it, because she will intuitively conclude that it has a higher value on her target 
criteria.165 
2.  Acquired Distinctiveness, Fame, and the Role of Familiarity—Secondary 
meaning can be similarly identified with features of memory and their role in heuristic judgment.  
Again, the associative system of cognition plays an important role here.  One consumer 
psychologist has proposed that secondary meaning represents the creation of “associative 
networks” around a mark in the minds of a substantial number of consumers, and that these 
networks are activated as part of the recall process triggered by subsequent exposure to the 
trademark.166 In other words, through repeated exposure to a mark and experience with the types 
of goods it is associated with, a consumer comes to recall with increasing ease relevant 
information about and experiences with products bearing the mark whenever she encounters the 
mark.  Conceptually, this concept is similar to the notion of an “affective pool”:  a consumer’s 
experiences with a trademark will “tag” that mark with layers of meaning that will be 
 
165 Goldstein and Gigerenzer suggest that where the prerequisites for the recognition 
heuristic are met such judgments have what they call “ecological rationality”, by which they 
mean that the correlation of substitute attributes to target attributes may be theoretically validated 
by environmental mediators that make reliance on the recognition heuristic likely to lead to 
accurate outcomes.  Id. at 78.  In the consumer context this explanation seems sound insofar as 
many of our less significant purchasing decisions (concerning which we likely would not go to 
the trouble of extensively educating ourselves) are informed not by direct experience but by 
word-of-mouth and advertising. 
166 See Jacoby, supra note 153, at 1013; see also Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in 
Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2020, 2032 (2005) (“Trademark law, and the marketing 
literature with it, has long recognized that the more distinctive a trademark is from other marks, 
the greater is consumers’ ‘awareness’ of it and the more immediately ‘accessible’ it is in their 
memory.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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automatically drawn on whenever the mark is subsequently encountered and recalled.  Still, the 
separate cognitive processes triggered by knowledge and affect underlie an important distinction 
between the “associative network” and the “affective pool” in the trademark context:  recent 
research suggests that mental associations characterized by specific knowledge may indeed result 
from repeated experience with a brand, but that such associations serve only “subsidiary roles” in 
brand choice, with emotional or affective reactions and attitudes playing the lead role.167 
The dominance of affective response in consumer choice suggests another 
mechanism—beyond the affective pool—by which the breadth and frequency of exposure to a 
trademark might play a role in consumer decisionmaking.  It has been shown that simple 
familiarity with a stimulus increases positive affective response to it.168 In other words, the more 
often we are merely exposed to a stimulus, the stronger our affective response to it will be and 
the more likely we are to prefer it.169 As discussed above,170 our hypothetical consumer may try 
 
167 See Ambler et al., supra note 134, at 248 (citing references); Punj & Hillyer, supra note 
144, at 125-26. 
168 Frederick, supra note 132, at 548, 553; see also Ambler et al., supra note 134, at 253-54 
(discussing experimental results showing significant correlation between brand familiarity and 
selection of the brand, and quicker decisionmaking when faced with a familiar brand than with 
unfamiliar brands). 
169 Slovic, Finucane, Peters & MacGregor, supra note 132, at 400 (“[W]hen objects are 
presented to an individual repeatedly, the ‘mere exposure’ is capable of creating a positive 
attitude or preference for these objects.”); see also, e.g., Robert F. Bornstein, Exposure and 
Affect:  Overview and Meta-Analysis of Research, 1968-1987, 106 PSYCH. BULLETIN 265 (1989) 
(reviewing studies that document the “mere exposure effect”).  This feature of affective response 
has implications for manipulative advertising similar to those identified by Professors Hanson & 
Kysar.  See generally Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 131; Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously:  Some Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV.
1422 (1999) (hereinafter “Hanson & Kysar II”). 
170 Supra notes 136-144 and accompanying text. 
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to rationalize a purchase by telling herself she is buying a product of high quality, or safety, or 
value, or desirability, when in fact she is most likely relying on a simple affective response to the 
trademark on the product’s package.  While this affective response may be based on her 
experience with products bearing the mark, it may also be based on nothing more than 
affectively loaded advertising of the mark, or it may simply arise from the fact that she has seen 
the mark more often than other marks.  In short, consumer familiarity with a trademark through 
any prior exposure (other than one which generates negative affective responses) is likely to 
increase the positive affective response to products bearing that mark, and influence consumer 
decisionmaking accordingly.  Thus, secondary meaning and fame, which are generally measured 
in terms of the likelihood and magnitude of consumer exposure to a trademark, are legal 
constructs that reflect the affective pool, the influence on affect of repeated exposure and 
familiarity, and—to a lesser extent—the contribution of repeated exposure to associative 
networks of meaning connected to the mark.  Quite simply, in the absence of negative 
associations with a mark, the more widespread the mark is the stronger and more positive 
consumer response to it is likely to be. 
*** 
In sum, each of the metrics of mark strength used by courts to assess trademark 
liability addresses facts that will tend to increase consumers preferences for products bearing the 
mark in question by influencing cognitive functions and constructs—particularly those based on 
recognition and familiarity—that generate positive affective response. 
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C.  Similarity of Marks and Proximity of Markets:  The Roles of Similarity and Context 
The discussion thus far is useful in the examination of how trademarks operate, 
but it is relevant to trademark liability only to the extent that an accused mark might be identical 
to a plaintiff’s mark, and used on an identical product, thereby generating an identical response.  
To account for the law’s extension of liability beyond such circumstances (under either modern 
infringement doctrine or dilution doctrine), the role of similarity and context must be addressed, 
and indeed, the two dimensions interact considerably.171 Consumer response to a trademark that 
is similar, but not identical, to another, better-known mark (or identical to a better-known mark 
used on a different type of product) will likely be influenced by three types of cognitive 
phenomena:  illusions, context effects, and anchoring bias. 
1.  Mark Similarity and Perceptual/Cognitive Illusions—The interaction of 
perception and memory often yields idiosyncratic results that could have particular relevance to 
consumer decisionmaking.  For example, when faced with a word recognition task, we often fail 
to detect small errors, and even fill in missing information, such that we are actually able to 
“see” a familiar word even when letters are missing, transposed, or replaced with other letters (or 
abstract characters).172 Memory can play similar tricks on us, particularly when a novel, 
distorted, or misplaced stimulus is presented in a context where we would expect to encounter a 
similar, familiar stimulus.  For example, when asked: “How many animals of each kind did 
 
171 For an earlier and somewhat different view of the interaction of similarity and context in 
the trademark arena, see Jacoby, supra note 153, at 1034-40. 
172 See Timothy R. Jordan, Sharon M. Thomas, & Kenneth C. Scott-Brown, The Illusory-
Letters Phenomenon: An Illustration of Graphemic Restoration in Visual Word Recognition, 28
PERCEPTION 1413, 1413, 1415-16 (1999), and sources cited therein. 
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Moses take with him on the ark?” most people will respond “two,” knowing full well that Noah 
is the bible’s ark-builder.173 The leading explanation for this phenomenon (known in the 
cognitive psychology literature as the “Moses Illusion”) is that when our memory is probed with 
some stimulus (such as a question), our cognitive system relies on “partial matching” to relate 
the present experience to the contents of memory: 
…[E]verything we see is varied from different perspectives, so we need to 
perform partial matches to recognize virtually anything.  Consequently, 
people are accustomed to being tolerant of discrepancies, and highly 
similar terms are allowed to slip by or are folded into existing 
representations….  Partial match is sufficient to retrieve information from 
memory and is itself an important matching process involved in memory 
retrieval.174 
The Moses Illusion reveals an important feature of recall tasks:  when a stimulus triggers a 
search of memory, we tend to overlook minor discrepancies between the stimulus and the 
representation of the relevant item in memory.  Similar memory illusions affect recognition 
tasks:  we are more likely to falsely recognize a novel stimulus if it is semantically, 
morphologically, or phonologically related to familiar stimuli.175 
173 See generally Thomas D. Erikson & Mark E. Mattson, From Words to Meaning: A 
Semantic Illusion, 20 J. OF VERBAL LEARNING AND BEHAVIOR, 540 (1981). 
174 Heekyeong Park & Lynne M. Reder, Moses Illusion, in COGNITIVE ILLUSIONS: A
HANDBOOK ON FALLACIES AND BIASES IN THINKING, JUDGMENT AND MEMORY 275, 285 
(Rüdiger F. Pohl, ed. 2004). 
175 See, e.g., Henry L. Roediger III & Kathleen B. McDermott, Creating False Memories:  
Remembering Words not Presented in Lists, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: LEARNING,
MEMORY, & COGNITION 803 (1995) (subjects falsely recognized words that were semantically 
related to words in studied lists); Jeffery J. Franks & John D. Bransford, Abstraction of Visual 
Patterns, 90 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 65 (1971) (subjects falsely recognized unstudied 
transformations of prototype shapes, with levels of recognition decreasing as degree of 
transformation increased.); Mitchell S. Sommers & Bryan P. Lewis, Who Really Lives Next 
Door?  Creating False Memories with Phonological Neighbors, 40 J. OF MEMORY & LANGUAGE 
83 (1999) (subjects falsely recognized unstudied phonological neighbors of words in previously 
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Extrapolating these features of human perception and memory to the trademark 
context, it is easy to see how similarity can play a role in consumer decisionmaking.  Subtle 
distortions of a known trademark may simply not be noticed by a consumer.  The distorted 
trademark may be erroneously recognized even if completely novel.  Indeed, it may even trigger 
the same affective response and recollection of the same memories as those associated with the 
known, similar trademark.  In either case, the consumer would likely be completely unaware that 
their response to the mark was based on a perceptual or cognitive error. 
2.  Market Proximity and Context Effects.—The modalities of the illusions 
described above also suggest a role for market proximity in consumer decisionmaking.  It has 
been shown, for example, that the Moses Illusion dissipates if the distorted term in the stimulus 
doesn’t semantically match the rest of the stimulus—people balk when asked how many animals 
Nixon brought on the ark.176 Put more generally: 
Semantic cohesion of the critical [distorted] term with the embedding 
context or proposition … affects the occurrence of the illusion.  When the 
distorted terms are totally unrelated to the script that is queried, the 
discrepancy is readily noticed.  On the other hand, when the replaced term 
is related to the remainder of the proposition or the general context of the 
query, noticing the distortions is quite difficult.  In other words, the more 
consistent the critical terms in the question are with the script or 
knowledge structure associated with [the memory to be recalled], the 
harder it is to notice that the wrong term is used.177 
aurally-presented lists); see generally Henry L. Roediger, Kathleen B. McDermott & Kerry J. 
Robinson, The Role of Associative Processes in Producing False Remembering, in 2 THEORIES 
OF MEMORY, 187 (Martin A. Conway, Susan E. Gathercole, & Cesare Cornoldi eds., 1998) 
(collecting recent research on memory illusions). 
176 Park & Reder, supra note 174, at 281-82. 
177 Id. at 283. 
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Just as the context of the sentence used as a memory probe in the Moses Illusion experiments 
limits the types of distortions that can go unnoticed, market context may influence the effect of 
an accused trademark use on the consuming public.  For example, a twelve-ounce aluminum can 
emblazoned with the words “Cold-Cola” in white-on-red script would probably automatically 
trigger associations with Coca-Cola beverages in the average consumer, whereas the same logo 
on a spray bottle of bathroom cleaner would cause consumers to shake their heads in 
befuddlement.  The same sort of disconnect is possible along other dimensions of market 
proximity:  we expect to see advertisements for “Goodyear” in automotive magazines, but not 
food and wine magazines; we expect to find “Microsoft” products in technology stores and on 
the Internet, but not at department stores; and we expect “Rolex” watches to cost thousands of 
dollars, not ten dollars. 
Marketing research bears out the importance of consistency of mark and context.  
Examining the marketing strategy of “brand extension”—the introduction of a new type of 
product under an existing, established brand name—researchers have concluded that consumers 
respond most favorably to extensions into product categories that “fit” well conceptually with the 
parent brand’s product category, without being essentially identical to that category.178 Indeed, 
sharply incongruent brand extensions not only turn consumers off to the extension itself, they 
can generate moderate feedback effects that diminish consumer response to the brand name 
 
178 See, e.g., David A. Aaker & Kevin Lane Keller, Consumer Evaluations of Brand 
Extensions, 54 J. MARKETING 27 (1990) (identifying the role of “fit” in the success of brand 
extensions); Paul A. Bottomley & Stephen J. S. Holden, Do We Really Know How Consumers 
Evaluate Brand Extensions? Empirical Generalizations Based on Secondary Analysis of Eight 
Studies, 38 J. OF MARKETING RESEARCH 494 (2001) (confirming Aaker and Keller’s hypothesis 
against subsequent critiques). 
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generally, and to a lesser extent even to the original product bearing the brand.179 Consumer 
psychologists attribute these context-sensitive responses to the cognitive burdens of reconciling 
the associations a mark activates in memory with the novel experience of its extension.  When 
encountered in a new context, the mark triggers a cognitive effort to “resolve and find meaning 
in the incongruity,” and the success of this effort generates a positive emotional response.180 
Where the context is so far removed from that with which the mark is associated that no 
resolution of the incongruity is possible, the unsuccessful cognitive effort to find some resolution 
“typically stimulate[s] negative feelings of frustration and helplessness.”181 Once again, affect 
 
179 Sandra J. Milberg, C. Whan Park, & Michael S. McCarthy, Managing Negative 
Feedback Effects Associated with Brand Extensions:  The Impact of Alternative Branding 
Strategies, 6 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOLOGY 119, 132-33 (1997) (demonstrating negative “feedback” 
effects on parent brands of ill-fitting product extensions); Barbara Loken & Deborah Roedder 
John, Diluting Brand Beliefs:  When Do Brand Extensions Have a Negative Impact?, 57 J. 
MARKETING 71 (1993) (same); Deborah Roedder John, Barbara Loken, & Christopher Joiner, 
The Negative Impact of Extensions:  Can Flagship Products Be Diluted?, 62 J. OF MARKETING 
19 (1998) (finding that “flagship products” are less vulnerable to negative feedback extensions 
than the brand itself).  Some consumer psychologists have already attempted to make the leap 
connecting the dilution concept of the brand extension literature with the dilution injury set forth 
in the FTDA.  See generally Maureen Morrin & Jacob Jacoby, Trademark Dilution:  Empirical 
Measures for an Elusive Concept, 19 J. OF PUBLIC POLICY & MARKETING 265 (2000).  However, 
as discussed in § IV.A, infra, the two concepts cannot be neatly mapped onto one another as the 
law currently stands. 
180 Joan Meyers-Levy, Therese A. Louie, & Mary T. Curren, How Does the Congruity of 
Brand Names Affect Evaluations of Brand Name Extensions?, 79 J. OF APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY 46, 
47 (1994). 
181 Id. The inability to resolve the conflict can be seen as a kind of cognitive dissonance; a 
mental contradiction that generates negative affective response.  See generally Eddie Harmon-
Jones, Cognitive Dissonance and Experienced Negative Affect:  Evidence that Dissonance 
Increases Experienced Negative Affect Even in the Absence of Aversive Consequences, 26
PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 1490 (2000) (demonstrating that a common 
laboratory model for generating cognitive dissonance causes test subjects to experience negative 
affect).  Similarly, the positive response to the ability to resolve an incongruity is consistent with 
that portion of cognitive dissonance theory that posits attitude change as a strategy to reduce the 
psychological discomfort that arises from dissonance.  See generally Andrew J. Elliot & Patricia 
G. Devine, On the Motivational Nature of Cognitive Dissonance:  Dissonance as Psychological 
Discomfort, 67 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 382 (1994) (demonstrating a model 
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plays a central role, here as the expression of cognitive response to the interaction of a mark and 
its context.  An accused mark appearing in a commercial context similar—but not identical—to 
that of a similar plaintiff’s mark may get an affective boost from the consumer’s effort to 
integrate the new context into their associations with the mark (with the plaintiff’s mark likely 
receiving a similar boost).  Conversely, an accused mark appearing in a commercial context 
irreconcirably dissimilar from that of a similar plaintiff’s mark will not only likely trigger a 
negative affective response, it will likely cause a feedback of negative affective associations with 
the plaintiff’s mark as used on the plaintiff’s products. 
3.  Anchoring Bias.—Similarity of marks and proximity of markets can also affect 
consumer decisionmaking by triggering the anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic.  Human beings 
often estimate values in conditions of uncertainty by starting with an initial given value (an 
“anchor”) and then adjusting from that value to arrive at a final answer.182 The anchor may be 
derived from a cue presented to the decisionmaker or self-generated in the process of searching 
memory for a candidate response.  When we use anchors in our decisionmaking, we tend to 
make insufficient adjustments, leading to biases in favor of the initial anchor.183 These biases 
 
of cognitive dissonance that wherein the dissonance motivates the individual to reduce 
psychological discomfort by changing the attitude that generates the dissonance). 
182 See, e.g., Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty:  Heuristics 
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 10, at 14-18. 
183 Id.  For example, in one famous study subjects were asked to estimate the percentage of 
African countries in the United Nations membership after watching a wheel containing numbers 
from one to one hundred being spun.  The wheel was rigged to land either on ten or sixty-five.  
When the wheel landed on the lower number, subjects’ mean estimate was that African countries 
comprised only twenty-five percent of the United Nations; when the wheel landed on the higher 
number, the mean estimate was forty-five percent.  Id. at 14; see also Hanson & Kysar I, supra 
note 131, at 667. 
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manifest themselves even when we are consciously aware (a) that the anchor is irrelevant, and 
(b) that it may nevertheless inappropriately influence our judgment.184 
In the typical laboratory test for anchoring effects, an arbitrary value is given to 
test subjects as a cue prior to a comparative judgment task.  In such situations, the initial cue acts 
as a “prime,” activating the cue and information associated with it in memory.185 When 
performing a subsequent comparative judgment task, the accessibility of the activated 
information leads the decisionmaker to evaluate the suitability of the cue as an answer.186 
“Because people evaluate hypotheses by trying to confirm them, the comparative assessment 
generates information disproportionately consistent with the anchor value, thereby biasing the 
subsequent judgment.”187 In some response tasks where a priming cue is not given, people 
attempting to will “self-generate” an anchor at a starting point they believe is close to the target 
value, then adjust from that anchor to arrive at a response without performing any more 
 
184 See Hanson & Kysar I, supra note 131, at 668 (“What is striking about this demonstration is 
that the anchor provided to the subjects was overtly random and irrelevant, yet still it had a 
significant impact on the subjects’ intuitive judgments.” (emphasis omitted)); Gretchen B. 
Chapman & Eric J. Johnson, Incorporating the Irrelevant:  Anchors in Judgments of Belief and 
Value, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 10, at 120, 125 (summarizing evidence that neither 
warning subjects not to be influenced by the anchor nor awareness by subjects of the anchor’s 
irrelevance could eliminate biases in favor of the anchor). 
 
185 Fritz Strack & Thomas Mussweiler, Explaining the Enigmatic Anchoring Effect:  
Mechanisms of Selective Accessibility, 73 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 437, 444 
(1997). 
186 See Chapman & Johnson, supra note 184, at 130-33. 
187 Epley & Gilovich, supra note 141, at 312 (internal citation omitted); see also Chapman & 
Johnson, supra note 184, at 133 (“[A]nchors have their effect because decision makers consider 
reasons why their value for the target item is like the anchor, but show relative neglect for 
reasons why their value for the item is unlike the anchor.”).  In essence, the anchoring and 
adjustment heuristic for externally provided anchors appears to be a species of confirmation bias.  
See also Chapman & Johnson, supra note 184, at 133-34 (discussing the connection between 
anchoring phenomena and confirmation bias). 
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cognitively taxing calculations.188 Because the adjustment effort is itself taxing, it tends to cease 
as soon as a minimally plausible value is reached, leading to a bias in favor of the self-generated 
anchor.189 
The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic provides a mechanism for similarity of 
marks and proximity of markets to affect consumer decisionmaking even where the consumer is 
not suffering from any illusion, and even where context effects are playing only a minor role.  A 
consumer confronted with a product bearing an unfamiliar trademark that is similar to a known 
trademark in the same product category may “self-generate” the known trademark as an anchor 
in an effort to assess the suitability of the product bearing the novel mark, rather than embarking 
on a far more taxing effort to educate herself about the meaning and significance of the novel 
mark.  As a result, her response to the novel mark is likely to be biased in the direction of her 
response to the known mark.  Conversely, where a second comer’s mark is used in a commercial 
context different from, but still related to, that of the mark’s owner, the owner’s mark and 
product may serve as an anchor, activating associations with the mark and product in the 
consumer’s memory, which then biases her response to the second comer’s product in the 
direction of those associations.190 In either case, the consumer’s response to the novel mark will 
 
188 Epley & Gilovich, supra note 141, at 312. 
189 Id. at 314-15. 
190 The qualification of this hypothesis (i.e., that the commercial context of the marks be 
related) takes into account the previous discussion concerning the cognitive dissonance and 
negative affect that arises from encountering a known stimulus in a completely foreign context.  
See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
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likely be closer to her response to the known mark than it would be if the two marks were 
completely dissimilar. 
D.  Consumer Care:  Minimizing Illusions, Mitigating Bias. 
The last proxy factor analyzed by courts in trademark cases—consumer care—can 
be understood as reflecting the role that attention plays in the cognitive processes described in 
this section.  For example, the types of perceptual illusions described above often dissipate with 
sufficient time and attention by the reader,191 as anyone who has ever done a quick read of a text 
followed by a close proofread can likely attest.  In contrast, memory illusions such as the Moses 
Illusion seem considerably less susceptible to dissipation by increased attention.192 The 
anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic also appears to be influenced by increased attention, though 
only in the case of self-generated anchors.193 A decisionmaker with the time, ability, and 
inclination to devote increased attention and effortful thinking to her decision is able to mitigate 
the bias that results from the tendency to stop adjusting as soon as a plausible value is reached, 
largely because she continues to adjust after a decisionmaker who did not perform such 
additional thinking would have stopped.194 Where an anchor is provided to the decisionmaker as 
a cue rather than self-generated, however, additional thinking and attention does not appear to 
 
191 See, e.g., Jordan, Thomas, & Scott-Brown, supra note 172, at 1413. 
192 Park & Reder, supra note 174, at 286-87. 
193 See generally Epley & Gilovich, supra note 141. 
194 Id. at 315-16. 
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significantly affect the resulting bias, mainly because the bias in such cases is akin to a 
confirmation bias rather than the result of actual adjustment.195 
In the trademark context, these effects of increased attention and care suggest that 
some of the effects of mark similarity and market proximity discussed above can be dissipated.  
Indeed, it appears that increased care can considerably mitigate the illusions and biases that arise 
from a subtly distorted mark, either by dissipating the illusion that causes the consumer to “see” 
a known mark in its stead, or by allowing her to continue to adjust her response away from the 
representation of the known mark she retrieved from memory.  In contrast, context effects appear 
far more difficult to dissipate, such that a novel mark presented in the same commercial context 
as a similar known mark is extremely likely to bias consumer response.  Similarly, where a novel 
mark is identical to a known mark (such that it activates memories of the mark itself rather than 
triggering a search of memory for similar marks), the priming effect of the mark is unlikely to be 
dissipated by additional attention or care. 
E.  Interaction of the Proxy Factors 
Taken together, the aspects of cognition discussed in this section will influence 
consumer decisionmaking in non-rational but somewhat predictable ways.  For example, where a 
plaintiff’s mark is strong enough to trigger a positive affective response, an accused mark similar 
enough to create a perceptual illusion may trigger the same affective response in time- or 
attention-limited purchasing situations.  Similarly, an identical accused mark in a different 
commercial context may trigger a positive affective response if the context is close enough to 
 
195 Id. at 312, 315-16; see supra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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that of the plaintiff’s mark to be cognitively resolvable, such that the representation of the 
plaintiff’s mark in memory serves as a plausible basis to form a judgment about the accused 
product.  Notably, in this case it is unlikely that additional time or attention will dissipate the 
likely bias toward the affective content of the plaintiff’s mark, given that the mark itself is 
presented as an anchor, rather than being self-generated.196 However, as the degree of mark 
similarity and market proximity between the two marks decreases, it becomes far less likely that 
affective response to the plaintiff’s mark will form a basis for the response to the accused mark.  
Indeed, only where the representation of the plaintiff’s mark in memory is exceedingly strong 
(and thus very easy to call to mind) would we expect a consumer to self-generate the plaintiff’s 
mark (and the affective content associated with it) when searching her memory for a basis to 
analyze an accused mark that is only marginally similar.  Finally, where the commercial context 
of a novel accused mark is so far removed from that of an plaintiff’s mark that there appears to 
be no way to cognitively resolve the difference between them, we would expect the consumer to 
have a negative affective response to the accused mark, with a moderate negative feedback effect 
on the plaintiff’s mark. 
 
196 The resistance of the bias generated by identical marks to amelioration through increased 
care counsels for unique treatment of identical marks in liability regimes.  Indeed, federal 
infringement law imposes stricter penalties for counterfeiting than for other types of 
infringement.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1117(b)-(c) (establishing statutory and treble damages for 
counterfeiting).  More to the point of this Article, as discussed in Section II.B.1, identity of 
marks is one of the only factors that is a reliable predictor of liability in the post-Moseley dilution 
context—another instance of judicial trademark doctrine reflecting bounded rationality.  See 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003); see also supra notes 115-120 and 
accompanying text. 
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IV.  A Behavioralist Theory of Tradmark Liability
The previous Part identified a number of cognitive processes that will influence 
consumer responses to trademarks and explained how they are connected to the proxy factors 
applied by courts in setting the boundaries of trademark liability.  Despite their potential to 
generate error and bias, the boundedly rational cognitive processes outlined in the previous Part 
are useful insofar as thoroughly rational approaches to purchase decisions would be grossly time-
consuming and inefficient.197 As discussed above, associative processes such as “choosing by 
liking” are quick and easy decisionmaking strategies that spare us the need for more cognitively 
taxing efforts.198 But this conservation of effort becomes self-defeating if the speedy judgments 
generated by boundedly rational consumers are consistently wrong.  Because consumer 
memories of and responses to a known trademark can influence their response to a novel mark 
even in the absence of any rational basis for such influence (indeed, even where the consumer 
knows there is no rational basis for such influence), certain novel marks are likely to lead 
consumers to make purchasing decisions that they would not make if they were proceeding 
rationally based on fuller information.  Each of the proxy factors discussed above addresses a 
cognitive bias or susceptibility to error that makes such influence more or less probable.  By 
 
197 That trademarks serve to lower consumer search costs is a fundamental tenet of the 
dominant law-and-economics model of trademark law.  See generally William M. Landes & 
Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law:  An Economic Perspective, 30 J. L. & ECON. 265 (1987); 
see also Brian A. Jacobs, Note, Trademark Dilution on the Constitutional Edge, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 161, 189-93 (2004); 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 14, at § 2:5, pp. 2-7 to 2-10 and sources 
cited therein.  However, the standard economic analysis is something of an inversion of the 
argument of this Article:  where law-and-economics scholars presume that the legal regime 
creates the efficiencies that justify its rules, this Article proposes that the cognitive processes of 
consumers are themselves the engines of efficiency, and the legal regime is constructed to 
harness those efficiencies while mitigating the errors that inevitably accompany them.   
198 See supra notes 128-130, 136-144, and accompanying text. 
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using the proxy factors as measures for the boundaries of trademark liability, the courts are 
essentially minimizing the effects of these biases and errors by proscribing and deterring the use 
of trademarks that cause such influence.  In short, the trademark liability regime is best 
understood as a debiasing strategy.199 As long as the marketplace reflects the expectations of 
boundedly rational consumers (for example, by requiring that products bearing identical 
trademarks have similar properties), the tendency of bounded rationality to introduce error and 
bias into consumer decisionmaking will be neutralized.200 
Shaping the market to ensure that similarly marked products bear similar 
properties could be a complex undertaking involving costly regulation and inspection regimes.  
To avoid such complexity, the bulk of federal trademark law delegates this responsibility to 
manufacturers.  The primary mechanism by which this delegation is accomplished is the 
fundamental principle of trademark law:  a one-manufacturer-per-mark rule, accompanied by a 
private right of action.  This mechanism is the pillar of the statutory trademark regime.201 As law 
and economics scholars have argued, this simple mechanism gives manufacturers powerful 
 
199 Cf. Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing through Law, 35 J. LEGAL STUD. 199, 
207-08 (2006) (describing product bans as an insulating strategy to eliminate the effects of 
optimism bias with respect to risky products).  What this Article refers to as a “debiasing 
strategy” would likely be referred to (perhaps denigrated) by Jolls and Sunstein as an 
“insulating” strategy.  See id. at 225 n.21 (distinguishing between the authors’ definition of 
“debiasing” and “insulating” strategies, the latter of which accepts boundedly rational behavior 
as given and seeks to reduce or eliminate its effects on legal outcomes).  No matter the label 
affixed to them, these strategies can be understood as legal rules and regimes that  
200 Cf. Frederick, supra note 132, at 554 (“The success of using one’s immediate affective 
response as a choice heuristic depends on how closely it corresponds to the actual value or 
subsequent utility.”). 
201 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq. (establishing trademark registers on the basis of 
a one-manufacturer-per-mark rule); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114-15, 1125 (providing remedies and private 
rights of action in trademark cases to, inter alia, the trademark registrant or senior user). 
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incentives to produce high-quality products.202 But the one-manufacturer-per-mark rule also has 
the important benefit of making it empirically more likely that similarly marked products will 
have similar properties, in at least two ways.  First, to the extent that a common manufacturing 
process is likely to generate relatively consistent products as output, the one-manufacturer-per-
mark rule will tend to increase the similarity of similarly marked products.  Second, insofar as 
the incentives described by law and economics scholars are effective, manufacturers in a one-
manufacturer-per-mark environment will tend to take steps to ensure the consistency of products 
bearing their mark (to the extent they are able to do so). 
While this mechanism is a simple and elegant solution to what could be a thorny 
debiasing problem, standing alone it is not sufficient to prevent consumers from making 
decisions out of bias or error, due to the effects of the cognitive phenomena discussed in Part III.  
Based on that disucssion, we can expect consumer decisionmaking to be improperly influenced 
in two general ways, which I will characterize as ex ante and point-of-sale manipulation.203 Ex 
ante manipulation refers to the ability of experience to alter the “affective pool” and other 
information associated with a mark in memory;204 these experiences will occur in advance of the 
purchasing decision that is the ultimate target of trademark liability.  Point-of-sale manipulation 
refers to features of the purchasing environment that influence the consumer’s judgment at the 
 
202 See supra note 197, and sources cited therein. 
203 As should be evident from the discussion in the text, ex ante and point-of-sale 
manipulation correlate to the cognitive processes of memory encoding and memory retrieval, 
respectively.  See generally Scott C. Brown & Fergus I. M. Craik, Encoding and Retrieval of 
Information, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF MEMORY, supra note 157, at 93. 
204 See supra notes 134-135, 153-152, 166-170 and accompanying text. 
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time a purchasing decision is made, including everything from traditional “passing off” to the 
illusions, context effects, and anchoring effects discussed above.205 A properly designed liability 
regime will have to address both ex ante and point-of-sale manipulations; the most obvious way 
to accomplish this is by proscribing trademark uses that generate them. 
An additional layer of rules to encompass subtle trademark manipulations has 
historically been provided by the courts through the gradual expansion of liability described in 
Part I and the development of the proxy factors discussed in Part II.  The fact that these doctrines 
developed by fits and starts, within the framework of the statutory regime and in the shadow of 
the historical aversion to property rights in trademarks, is likely responsible for the law’s 
preoccupation with the relationship between mark and maker, as well as the battle in dilution 
theory between uniqueness (an ex ante concern) and free-riding (a point-of-sale concern).  The 
result is a timid and confused doctrinal structure that aims somewhat to the side of the 
manipulations that it should be targeting directly.  The remainder of this Article will explore the 
ways in which the species of liability described in Part II approximate (or fail to approximate) 
the point-of-sale and ex ante manipulations that trademark law should be designed to prevent.  
Bringing the discussion of Part III to bear on the disparities between current doctrine and the 
doctrines implied by behavioralist analysis, a way out of the dilution dilemma can be seen.  
Further, because strict adherence to a behavioralist model of trademark liability has the potential 
to greatly broaden the scope of such liability, this Article closes with an analysis of policy 
objections that may be raised by the model. 
 
205 See supra §§ III.C-D. 
71 
A.  Understanding the Species of Liability 
Set against a background rule of one-manufacturer-per-mark, analysis of the 
cognitive phenomena described in Part III provides a sufficient basis for setting the boundaries of 
trademark liability in such a way as to prevent most if not all of the manipulations of consumer 
decisionmaking a trademark can cause.  The discussion in Part III makes clear how such 
manipulations operate; the fact that they correlate to the proxy factors developed by the courts 
suggests that the federal trademark regime captures (or has the capacity to capture) most of the 
harms at issue in trademark cases.  But by casting their decisions as assessments of consumer 
beliefs as to the relationship between mark and maker, courts add a needless layer of complexity 
to the analysis,206 weakening the justifications for liability and generating distracting and 
counter-productive policy debates such as those currently wracking dilution law.  By casting off 
the historical tethers that link liability to such consumer beliefs, and tying it instead to consumer 
reactions to a mark itself, Congress and the courts could shift focus from circular policy debates 
about the purpose of the trademark regime to more productive efforts to calibrate the regime’s 
effects on the marketplace. 
The various species of liability outlined in Part II of this Article are poor 
substitutes for a direct assessment of consumers’ affective responses to trademarks.  They serve 
mainly to provide a rationally describable justification for the imposition of liability that is in 
fact based on boundedly rational behavior. A brief comparison of two sub-species of 
infringement will demonstrate how this effort to say one thing while doing another leads to 
 
206 The legal fiction of the anonymous source is perhaps the clearest manifestation of the 
wasteful complexity of trademark law’s obsession with legal history.  See supra note 62 and 
accompanying text.  This Section will explore additional examples of such formalist inefficiency. 
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unnecessary complexity.  The most basic and longest recognized form of liability—for 
infringement based on point-of-sale confusion207—can be easily described in terms of the 
cognitive processes outlined in Part III.  An accused mark that—by virtue of cognitive illusions, 
context effects, and anchoring bias—is likely at the point of sale to lead to a purchase decision 
influenced by consumers’ affective reactions to someone else’s mark is precisely the type of use 
courts are likely to find infringing when they apply the proxy factors.  This is the quintessential 
form of point-of-sale manipulation:  a consumer’s response to a known mark is invoked and 
manipulated through non-rational cognitive processes, leading to a purchase decision that the 
consumer would not have made otherwise. 
The purportedly distinct doctrine of initial-interest confusion208 is nothing more 
than a special case of this general phenomenon, one dominated by anchoring effects.  Where a 
novel mark generates a fleeting perceptual illusion that is dissipated by consumer attention, or 
triggers the recall of a similar known mark, anchoring effects can continue to bias the affective 
response to the mark in the direction of the illusory or recalled image—which explains why 
courts will impose liability against the users of such marks where the anchor is already used as 
another’s trademark.  That a consumer is not confused as to the affiliation, connection, or 
association of the product’s manufacturer or the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the product at 
the time of sale is considered no barrier to liability in initial-interest cases.209 This fact strongly 
supports the hypothesis of this Article, that what courts are really measuring in infringement 
 
207 See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
208 See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
209 See supra note 66 and sources cited therein. 
73 
cases isn’t confusion at all.  Absent confusion at the time of sale, it is only the bias generated by 
anchoring effects that justifies this class of trademark liability.  And notably, this bias poses 
precisely the same risk as point-of-sale confusion:  that the consumer will make a purchase 
decision she would not otherwise make as a result of her boundedly rational reaction to a 
trademark.  By attempting to explain such bias in terms of confusion as defined under the 
Lanham Act, rather than as a function of bounded rationality, the courts substitute a rationally 
tractable but descriptively misleading theory of harm for a more descriptive theory that 
challenges the historical foundations and taxonomies of trademark law.  The result is an 
unpersuasive, needlessly complex, formalist doctrinal architecture that weakens the justifications 
for imposing liability. 
One might be tempted, based on the prior two examples, to believe that the 
descriptive shortcomings of current doctrine could be ameliorated by assuming that infringement 
represents point-of-sale manipulation, and dilution—with its overt concern for the prospective 
source-identifying capacity of a plaintiff’s mark—must therefore represent ex ante manipulation.  
This would, unfortunately, be an oversimplification.  One barrier to this neat division of 
doctrines is the fact that in every point-of-sale manipulation lies the seed of an ex ante 
manipulation.  When a consumer makes a purchase decision based on bias or error an injury 
surely occurs, but the consumer’s experience with the purchased product will itself influence her 
future judgment.210 To the extent the experience is inconsistent with the properties of the mark 
owner’s actual products, her future decisions will be improperly biased by the results of her 
 
210 See supra notes 134-135, 166-167 and accompanying text.  
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earlier purchase decision.  Generalizing this dynamic to the market at large, there is an obvious 
potential for ex ante and point-of-sale manipulations to feed on each other, snowballing to the 
point where trademarks become completely unreliable as a basis for consumer decisionmaking. 
The doctrine of post-sale confusion illustrates current doctrine’s inability to 
address the dual and self-reinforcing nature of trademark manipulation.  This class of liability, 
based on the influence on future purchasers of other consumers’ possession of products bearing 
an accused mark,211 would appear to be a form of ex ante manipulation.  It is not the immediate 
effect of the encounter with an accused mark, but the effect of this encounter on a consumer’s 
future decisionmaking, that liability for post-sale confusion ostensibly seeks to curtail.  However, 
one could just as easily argue that post-sale confusion constitutes a point-of-sale manipulation, 
albeit one that cannot be plausibly explained in terms of consumer beliefs about the connection 
between mark and maker.  The fact that the cases describing post-sale confusion generally deal 
with “knock-offs” of luxury or status goods suggests that it is the affective response to the status 
conveyed by the mark that leads consumers to decide to purchase the accused goods.212 This 
being the case, the decision to purchase a knock-off can be understood as an anchoring 
 
211 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
212 See supra note 67 and sources cited therein.  As Professor Beebe notes: 
[F]irms produce trademarks as status goods, …consumers consume trademarks to 
signal status, and …courts routinely invest trademarks with legal protection in an 
effort to preserve this status-signaling function.  The culture industries—and what 
industries aren’t?—have long sold trademarks as commodities in their own right. 
Entire areas of trademark doctrine cannot be understood except as systems of 
rules designed to facilitate the commodification—indeed, the “industrial 
production”—of social distinction. 
Beebe, supra note 61, at 624 (footnote omitted). 
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phenomenon functionally indistinguishable from initial-interest confusion.  Indeed, the only real 
difference between the two scenarios is the lack of any plausible basis to claim that there was 
even an instant where the consumer in the post-sale confusion scenario was “confused” as 
defined under the Lanham Act.  In short, courts parsing these three species of infringement213 
have wasted considerable effort attempting to invent strained and divergent justifications for 
liability against what are in fact minor variations of precisely the same phenomenon.  Again, the 
law’s preoccupation with the mark/maker nexus obscures the harms at issue in trademark cases, 
weakening the justifications for imposing liability. 
The interrelationship of point-of-sale and ex ante manipulations, and the 
concomitant impossibility of neatly assigning the former to infringement doctrine and the latter 
to dilution doctrine, is also largely responsible for the crippling theoretical debates that have 
brought federal dilution law to its current state of indeterminacy.  Originally conceived as a way 
 
213 This discussion omits the fourth and final infringement theory—reverse confusion—not 
because the theory is incompatible with the behavioralist model, but because reverse confusion is 
a special case where administrability concerns trump the policy of using bounded rationality to 
streamline consumer decisionmaking.  At first blush, the concept of reverse confusion would 
seem to challenge this Article’s contention that trademark liability exists to harness the affect-
driven bounded rationality of consumers; after all, the doctrine proscribes use of a trademark that 
generates a strong affective response in favor of one that does not (or at least, does so to a lesser 
degree). See supra note 68 and accompanying text.  But rather than engage in a complex and 
costly fight over which manufacturer’s use of a mark generates the strongest affective response, 
trademark law imposes a bright-line rule of priority-in-time (combined with the notice system of 
the Federal Register) to avoid such disputes entirely.  See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq.
(establishing the Principal and Supplemental Trademark Registers and the procedures for their 
operation); cf. Pierre Schlag, Rules and Standards, 33 UCLA L. REV. 379, 387-88 (1985) 
(outlining generic arguments for and against bright-line notice rules in legal systems such as 
property law).  Like all bright-line rules, the priority-in-time rule in trademark law will 
invariably lead to undesirable results at the margins (such as the proscription of a mark that eases 
consumer decisionmaking), but this may be deemed an acceptable exchange for the increased 
administrability of the system as a whole. 
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to extend trademark rights outside the immediate commercial sphere of their owner’s use,214 
dilution can be seen as an obsolete gap-filling measure, capturing point-of-sale manipulations 
that went unremedied under the infringement doctrine of Schechter’s day but are now subsumed 
within the broadened infringement provisions of the modern Lanham Act.215 Yet owing to the 
antipathy of contemporary doctrine to such broad trademark rights, the original enunciation of 
dilution theory under the rubric of uniqueness was directed at ex ante concerns, despite its 
author’s apparent concern for point-of-sale manipulations associated with free-riding.216 It is 
precisely the dual nature of trademark harms—the tendency of ex ante manipulations to ripen 
into point-of-sale ones, and vice versa, in a self-amplifying loop—that allowed Schechter to 
carry out this theoretical pas de deux—one which is being repeated today in the clashes between 
Congress and the courts.217 The behavioralist model has the potential to liberate trademark 
doctrine from this dilemma, by accounting for the interconnectedness of all forms of trademark 
liability. 
Taking as an example the standard dilution-by-blurring scenario of a famous mark 
being used by a second comer in a commercial context far removed from that of its owner, the 
discussion of Part III suggests that the second comer’s product will receive an affective boost 
where the commercial contexts are related enough to be cognitively resolvable, but will generate 
 
214 See supra notes 24-37 and accompanying text. 
215 See supra notes 40-50 and accompanying text. 
216 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
217 See supra notes 3-7, 112-114 and accompanying text. 
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negative affect where the commercial contexts are too far removed for such resolution.218 This 
effect suggests an explanation for the earlier observation that the policies of infringement and 
free-riding theories of dilution are identical.219 In cases where the commercial context of an 
accused mark is close enough to that of the plaintiff’s mark to generate a positive affective 
response, infringement and free-riding dilution will be functionally indistinguishable.  Both 
species of liability proscribe trademark uses in which a novel mark triggers a more positive 
affective response than it otherwise would due to its similarity to a known mark; the cognitive 
phenomena that generate such a bias provide a single basis for liability under infringement 
doctrine and under free-riding theories of dilution.  It may be that Congress believes modern 
infringement doctrine is underinclusive with respect to this type of point-of-sale manipulation, 
just as the underinclusiveness of the “same descriptive properties” standard led Schechter to 
propose the dilution remedy in the first place.  But the legislative decision to remedy this 
shortcoming by promulgating an almost entirely redundant remedy that by its terms only 
obliquely addresses the targeted conduct,220 rather than expanding the scope of the existing 
remedy, has generated unnecessary confusion and further confused the justifications for 
trademark liability. 
Just as the free-riding theory of dilution parallels the point-of-sale manipulations 
of infringement, the uniqueness theory of dilution could be understood as a foil for 
infringement’s ex ante aspects—the pollution of the affective pool and associative networks 
 
218 See supra notes 178-181 and accompanying text. 
219 See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text. 
220 See supra notes 54-60, 113-114 and accompanying text.  
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surrounding the plaintiff’s mark with associations that bear no empirical relationship to the 
plaintiff’s products.221 Were this the case, we could consider the two doctrines entirely 
redundant.  But there is another ex ante effect that uniqueness-based dilution—by both blurring 
and tarnishment—can create.  This effect arises from the negative affective feedback that accrues 
to a familiar mark when consumers encounter the mark in a cognitively unresolvable context.222 
Such reactions fall outside of the manipulations identified with infringement—the latter arising 
in contexts that lend themselves to cognitive resolution—yet have the potential to cause 
consumers to make decisions they would not otherwise make with respect to the senior user’s 
products in future purchasing scenarios by altering affective associations with the senior user’s 
mark.  However, we have seen that the negative feedback effect on the known mark is likely to 
be less significant than the negative affective response that will accrue to the novel mark as a 
result of the contextual incompatibility.223 In other words, where a diluting use cannot also be 
described as infringing by virtue of its point-of-sale effects, it is likely to be an unsuccessful 
marketing strategy.  Given that such uses are the antithesis of free-riding, and actually harm the 
second comer’s prospects in the marketplace, one would expect them to be extremely rare, more 
likely based on coincidence or ignorance of the senior user’s mark than any project to manipulate 
 
221 See supra note 210 and accompanying text. 
222 See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text.  For most well-known marks, the 
typical tarnishing contexts of sexual activity and drug use will generally be cognitively 
unresolvable, suggesting that tarnishment is merely a special case of the more general ex ante 
manipulation of uniqueness-theory blurring.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text 
(describing the typical association of tarnishment with drugs and sexual activity). 
223 See supra notes 178-181 and accompanying text. 
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consumer reactions to it.224 Yet such manipulation appears to be the only justification for a 
distinct legal remedy based on the uniqueness theory of dilution that is not already encompassed 
by other theories. 
In sum, the species of liability that exist under current trademark law are largely 
redundant.  Because of the law’s focus on consumer beliefs about the connection between mark 
and maker, rather than their automatic cognitive reactions to trademarks, courts have proposed 
multiple unpersuasive models in an effort to explain relatively minor variations in certain 
cognitive processes.  These processes are susceptible to two broad classes of manipulation:  
point-of-sale manipulations, which influence the consumer’s judgment at the time a purchasing 
decision is made, and ex ante manipulations, which influence consumer memories and 
associations in advance of a purchasing decision.  Neither category can be clearly mapped to any 
current theory of trademark liability, though the tools for detecting and analyzing them exist in 
the proxy factors developed by the courts for analyzing all species of trademark liability.  The 
discussion in this section suggests that current conceptions of infringement may be 
underinclusive to the extent that a dilution remedy is seen as necessary to correct free-riding 
problems, while the prevailing uniqueness-based conception of dilution provides a unique 
 
224 The rarity of such manipulations is further suggested by the unlikelihood that a consumer 
would independently recall a known mark a commercial context far enough removed from its 
typical context that the distance would generate unresolvable cognitive dissonance resulting in 
negative affective response.  Given the low baseline probability of such recall, and taking into 
account earlier discussions about the unique anchoring effects attributable to identical marks, we 
would expect the type of ex ante manipulation discussed in this paragraph to manifest itself only 
where the known mark is extremely strong and perceptually indistinguishable from the novel 
mark—which is consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in Moseley. Compare supra notes 
190-196 and accompanying text (discussing the unique cognitive effects of identical marks); with 
Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003) (noting the strong probative value of 
identical marks in dilution cases). 
80 
remedy only for a very small class of trademark harms.  This discussion would therefore counsel 
for a conscious reconsideration of the justifications for trademark liability, with an eye to 
expanding the role of infringement and contracting the role of dilution. 
B.  Policy Objections 
The suggestion that any species of trademark liability be expanded is likely to 
give pause to those who argue that current trademark rights are already too broad.  In particular, 
the expansion of liability would invariably dredge up hoary concerns about the granting of “in 
gross” property rights in trademarks.225 As described in the previous section, however, 
trademark rights are not properly understood as proprietary.  Rather, the trademark owner’s right 
is best understood as a private right of action designed to enforce the systemic market regulation 
necessary to harness the efficiencies of boundedly rational consumer decisionmaking, assigned 
to the party in the system with the greatest incentive to monitor the market for behaviors that 
might generate consumer bias or error.  That such systemic regulation may resemble a system of 
property rights in some of its results does not render the right proprietary; to the contrary, the 
dependence of enforcement on the boundedly rational thought processes of consumers places 
trademark rights in a state of constant flux, eternally contingent on the changing commercial 
environment and the minds of the consumers who fill it.226 
225 See supra notes 12-29 and accompanying text. 
226 See Beebe, supra note 166, at 2022 (“Trademark law is arguably the most difficult of the 
intellectual property laws to contemplate, and its outcomes when applied to facts are the most 
difficult to predict.  This is because it requires…the capability…to think through the consumer 
and see the marketplace only as the consumer sees it.” (footnotes omitted)) 
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Even accepting the non-proprietary nature of the trademark right, one might 
object that the scope of trademark liability outlined in this article, dependent as it is on 
particularly pliable features of human cognition, has no meaningful limits and could be expanded 
to a degree that severely limits commercial freedom.  For example, by expanding the scope of 
liability to aggressively reduce error and bias, the law redistributes power in the marketplace 
from consumers to producers, reducing consumer autonomy.227 This is a particularly troubling 
step when we consider that bounded rationality varies across the population, implying that some 
of the consumers whose autonomy is restricted by law receive little or no benefit from the law’s 
more muscular protections.228 Expansive trademark liability can also injure producers and the 
market as a whole, by contributing to a scarcity of useful marks and thereby raising barriers to 
entry and generating monopolistic or rent-seeking behavior.229 
One possible answer to these substantial concerns lies in the administration of a 
trademark system consciously designed to address bounded rationality.  Because the cognitive 
processes discussed in this article are not susceptible to deductive reasoning, leaving their 
application to judges is not a particularly reliable method for achieving the law’s goal of 
 
227 Cf. id. at 2066-69 (arguing that the expansion of trademark liability is an self-
perpetuating phenomenon in which producers assume consumer search costs in exchange for the 
concomitant ability to exert a stronger persuasive influence over the consumer). 
228 See Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 199, at 226 (“In responding to problems of bounded 
rationality, it is preferable, when possible, to develop legal approaches that avoid imposing 
significant costs on those who do not engage in boundedly rational behavior.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
229 Cf. Stephen L. Carter, The Trouble with Trademark, 99 YALE L. J. 759, 768-75 (1990) 
(outlining the problem of scarcity of useful trademarks); Landes & Posner, supra note 197, at 
289-92 (discussing the interrelationship of elasticity of supply of trademarks and the ability of 
early market entrants to extract rents). 
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proscribing trademark uses that generate bias and error in consumer decisionmaking.  Judges are 
just as susceptible to bounded rationality in adjudication as consumers are in their purchasing 
decisions.230 Moreover, the lack of a rational basis for the cognitive phenomena described in this 
Article suggests that they are best measured empirically rather than deductively, and a district 
judge hearing an application for an injunction in a trademark dispute is a statistical sample of 
one.  As a result, it seems that in all but the most clear-cut cases, trademark plaintiffs should bear 
the burden of providing an empirical basis for their claims, which would likely take the form of 
consumer surveys.  For example, point-of-sale manipulations would likely be measured by 
consumer surveys of the type courts have become familiar with through experience with Lanham 
Act cases,231 perhaps with a greater focus on controlled experiments simulating actual 
purchasing decisions rather than the traditional model of stimulus presentation followed by 
batteries of interrogatories.  Ex ante manipulations, in contrast, would likely require development 
of new and different types of consumer surveys, perhaps incorporating longitudinal studies that 
might in turn become routine parts of trademark enforcement programs. 
Even a heavy empirical burden on trademark plaintiffs will not necessarily 
alleviate all the problems of scarcity and diminished consumer autonomy threatened by the 
expansive theories of liability set forth in this Article.  However, the courts have many prudential 
doctrines at their disposal that can act as a pressure-release valve on the self-perpetuating engine 
 
230 See Beebe, supra note 95, at 19-20 (describing judicial use of heuristics to circumvent the 
multi-factor analyses of trademark doctrine). 
231 See, e.g., Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229, 235 (2d ed. 2000) (noting 
the routine use of survey evidence in Lanham Act cases). 
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of liability.  For example, the doctrines of genericness232 and functionality233 allow courts to 
deny enforcement of trademark rights the assertion of which would put the owner’s 
competitors—or the market in general—at a disadvantage due to problems of scarcity.  These 
prudential doctrines, unlike the cognitive phenomena that are the primary focus of this Article, 
do not necessarily require rigorous empirical analysis; finding a balance between conflicting 
policy imperatives on a case-by-case basis is a task to which courts are well accustomed. 
Finally, while trademark law enjoins persons other than the mark owner from 
manipulating consumer reactions to a trademark, it leaves the full range of such manipulations 
open to the mark owner for exploitation.  For example, a mark owner might pursue an 
advertising campaign based on overwhelming repetition or affective imagery, generating positive 
consumer responses that have little or nothing to do with their experience with the mark owner’s 
product.234 Likewise, a mark owner could “leverage” the affective reaction to her mark by 
means of a brand-extension strategy such as those described in Section III.C.2 above.  When 
properly calibrated, such a strategy could generate positive affective reactions to a new 
trademark or product without any empirical basis for such reactions in consumer experience or in 
the realities of production.  Generalizing this potential even further, the broad array of 
 
232 See supra note 146 and accompanying text. 
233 See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (holding that a 
product feature cannot serve as a trademark “if exclusive use of the feature would put 
competitors at a significant non-reputation-related disadvantage”); Wallace Int’l Silversmiths v. 
Godinger, 916 F.2d 76, 81 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting that a trademark will not be enforced where 
liability “would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of adequate alternative 
designs”). 
234 See supra notes 131-135, 163-165, 168-170 and accompanying text. 
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manipulations to which licensing schemes lend themselves have still greater potential to divorce 
the affective response to a mark from the empirical realities of products bearing that mark.235 
While remedies against false advertising236 and doctrines such as the prohibition against “naked 
licensing”237 suggest potential tools to mitigate such abuse, a behavioralist understanding of 
trademark liability implies a range of targets for regulation, some of which may implicate serious 
First Amendment and other concerns, and all of which require delicate balancing of harms, 
benefits, and normative commitments.238 
CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to make the case for a reconception of trademark 
liability as a debiasing strategy.  By drawing parallels between the organically evolving doctrines 
of trademark law and the cognitive predicates of bounded rationality, it has suggested a model of 
liability that uses existing doctrinal tools to illustrate the potential for a robust legal regime that 
would shed the most disingenuous justifications on which liability now rests, while providing 
protection against all conceivable trademark injuries.  To be sure, such a reconception of 
 
235 See, e.g., Beebe et al., supra note 5, at 863-66 (providing an overview of the commercial 
popularity and success of extensive trademark licensing). 
236 See generally Jean Wegman Burns, Confused Jurisprudence: False Advertising under the 
Lanham Act, 79 B. U. L. REV. 807 (1999) (charting the development and shortcomings of false 
advertising remedies under the Lanham Act). 
237 See Rudolph J. Kuss, Naked Licensing Doctrine Exposed:  How Courts Interpret the 
Lanham Act to Require Licensors to Police Their Licensees & Why This Requirement Conflicts 
with Modern Licensing Realities & the Goals of Trademark, 9 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 361,
362-71 (2005) (providing an overview of naked licensing doctrine). 
238 Such regulatory targets and their analysis are beyond the scope of the present article, but 
could include the marketing of generic products, comparative advertising, and indeed advertising 
in general.  The normative objections to heavy regulation in these areas, as in many areas where 
heuristics play a role, are extremely strong.  Cf. Jolls & Sunstein, supra note 199, at 225-34. 
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trademark liability poses particular challenges, notably of administration and market 
manipulation.  But it is the premise of this Article that law functions best when it takes an honest 
view of its subject—the boundedly rational human—and uses that subject as the measuring stick 
for doctrine, adapting its methods to achieve the most desirable results.  In this respect, a 
behavioralist model of trademark liability has the potential to not only protect the boundedly 
rational actor from bias and error, but to harness her cognitive quirks for her own benefit and the 
benefit of the market as a whole. 
